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 Studies of life span development in everyday problem solving suggest two 
trajectories of change in adulthood: individuals become less effective at solving well-
defined instrumental problems but more effective at managing ill-defined interpersonal 
problems. Two experiments were conducted to examine the ability of young and older 
adults to effectively manage an interpersonal problem that has a well-defined measure of 
instrumental success. Participants played an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with 
same-age, computer-simulated strangers (Experiment 1) and friends (Experiment 2). 
Success was dependent upon one’s ability to put aside self-interest and cooperate with a 
partner. Computer-simulated partners reciprocated the participants’ decisions 100% of 
the time or behaved in a more self-interested manner. Young and older adults’ tendencies 
to create conflict with the reciprocating partner and their defensive reactions to the selfish 
partner were examined. Although young adults outperformed older adults when playing 
the game on their own, they did not carry this performance advantage into the interactive 
rounds. In fact, despite their success when playing alone, young adults were no more 
successful than older adults when interacting with others. Young and older adults both 
cooperated more with friends than with strangers and more with the reciprocating partner 
than the selfish partner. However, when the participants’ first interaction was with a 
selfish stranger, older adults were more cooperative than young adults and consequently 
accrued more reward. This is consistent with previous research demonstrating that older 
adults use more passive interpersonal problem solving strategies than young adults, and it 
also partially supports the prediction that advancing age leads to more effective strategy 





 Advancing age is associated with competing trajectories of gains and losses. 
Normative physical and cognitive declines co-occur in late life with gains in maturity and 
experience (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Riediger, Li, & Lindenberger, 2006). Despite being 
outperformed by young adults on a number of tasks which broadly characterize adult 
cognition, older adults live independently and function autonomously in the community. 
In fact, some research suggests that a certain resiliency develops throughout adulthood 
which helps older adults to respond in more flexible ways than young adults when 
dealing with the demands of everyday life (Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Blanchard-Fields, 
Mienaltowski, & Seay, 2007). Sometimes referred to as the paradox of cognitive aging, 
this blending of competing trends is quite evident in the literature on everyday problem 
solving.  
 Traditionally, everyday problem solving has been examined through the lens of a 
person’s ability to successfully accomplish instrumental activities of daily life. However, 
successful functioning also involves maintaining harmony in one’s current relationships 
and in interactions that one may have with strangers and acquaintances when 
accomplishing personal goals. Generally speaking, older adults are characterized as being 
more effective than young adults at resolving interpersonal conflict (Blanchard-Fields, 
2007). The belief is that advancing age is associated with the development of social 
expertise that allows older adults to more flexibly and effectively implement strategies 
when faced with interpersonal conflict. Of course, it is more difficult to examine effective 
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interpersonal problem solving than effective instrumental problem solving because 
interpersonal problems tend to involve socioemotional factors that are difficult to control, 
are less structured, and have multiple solutions. As a result, few studies have been able to 
capture age differences in social expertise. The pair of studies reported herein addresses 
this issue by examining the strategies that young and older adults used to manage conflict 
that emerged during the course of an interactive game with an objective definition of 
effective game performance. Overall, these two studies had four main objectives: (1) To 
characterize the strategies that young and older adults implemented during conflict that 
emerged in the context of the game; (2) To examine how effective young and older adults 
were at reaching the game’s objective despite the presence of conflict; (3) To see if 
young and older adults would flexibly implement behavioral strategies when confronted 
by two different types of social partner (i.e., cooperative versus selfish); and (4) To 
investigate the role that interpersonal closeness (i.e., situations involving strangers versus 
those involving friends) played in strategy choice when young and older adults were 






2.1 Age Differences in Everyday Problem Solving 
 Everyday problems include both well-defined instrumental problems (e.g., 
medication adherence) and ill-defined emotionally evocative interpersonal problems 
(e.g., conflicts with friends or family members) (Berg, Strough, Calderone, Sansone, & 
Weir, 1998). Instrumental problems emerge when one experiences an obstacle while 
trying to achieve a personally relevant competence-related goal that does not involve 
other people. Such problems are usually resolved by thinking about a solution or taking 
some direct action to eliminate the obstacle. Research on age differences in instrumental 
problem solving demonstrates that both young and older adults volunteer solutions that 
directly address the obstacle at hand, but that young adults generate more safe and 
effective solutions than do older adults (Berg, Meegan, & Klaczynski, 1999; Denney, 
1990). Conversely, interpersonal problems occur when the harmony in a relationship 
between two people is disrupted by a conflict (Berg et al., 1998). Although direct action 
is sometimes used to resolve interpersonal problems, conflict in a relationship often 
creates negative emotions that also require mitigation. As with instrumental problems, 
both young and older adults prefer to use direct, purposeful action when resolving 
interpersonal problems (Blanchard-Fields, Chen, & Norris, 1997). However, older adults 
are more likely than young adults to tackle both the practical and the emotional concerns 
of the problem, and thus are considered to be more effective at solving interpersonal 
problems (Blanchard-Fields, Jahnke, & Camp, 1995; Blanchard-Fields et al., 2007; 
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Watson & Blanchard-Fields, 1998). Across problems, young adults may offer more 
possible solutions, but older adults are more likely to factor in strategies that also address 
the problems’ emotional side-effects.  
 
2.2 Problem Solving Effectiveness 
 This difference in young and older adults’ response tendencies raises an important 
question about the definition of problem solving effectiveness. What matters more when 
resolving problems- the number of solutions generated by the participant or the quality of 
the participant’s preferred solutions? Also, does the definition of effectiveness (i.e., 
number of solutions or quality of the preferred solution) change when considering 
whether the problem is instrumental or interpersonal in nature? Research examining 
instrumental functioning across the adult life span has based efficacy on the number of 
solutions generated and how closely a participant-generated solution matches some ideal 
solution (for review, Thornton & Dumke, 2005; Heidrich & Denney, 1994). When 
instrumental problems are tightly constrained to a single best solution or to an ideal 
sequence of responses (e.g., Willis & Marsiske, 1993), young adults typically outperform 
older adults. This age difference is misleading because most older adults function 
independently without much difficulty. One suggestion is that older adults’ performance 
in the lab only partially reflects their actual abilities (Marsiske & Margrett, 2006). This is 
supported on three levels. First, the tasks used to assess performance are tied to fluid 
cognitive abilities which typically decline with advancing age. Second, individual 
differences research on the latter half of life shows that everyday problem solving is 
multidimensional and not completely explained by traditional psychometric measures of 
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intelligence (Allaire & Marsiske, 2002; Marsiske & Willis, 1995). Finally, when faced 
with instrumental problems, older adults opt to use proactive strategies just as much as 
young adults do. Young adults may spontaneously describe several more ways to directly 
remove an obstacle to a goal than do older adults, but the solutions offered by older 
adults may be just as effective.  
 Another possible explanation for age-related decline in instrumental problem 
solving is that older adults approach problem solving from a qualitatively different 
perspective than young adults. With advancing age, physical and cognitive limitations 
motivate humans to carefully select where to invest their time and energy (Baltes, 1997; 
Jopp & Smith, 2006; Riediger & Freund, 2006). Although young adults might be willing 
to use resource-demanding strategies that match the requirements of a complex problem 
solving task, older adults may be motivated to conserve energy and use strategies that, 
although less effective than the ideal target strategy, are more familiar and have led to 
personal success in the past (Li, Lindenberger, Freund, & Baltes, 2001). Given these two 
possibilities, quantitative assessments of problem solving ability sometimes confound the 
breadth of an individual’s strategy repertoire with efficacy of the most preferred strategy 
(e.g., heuristics, see Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, & Martignon, 2002). 
 Similarly, judging problem solving efficacy based on how quickly a person finds 
the ideal strategy for eliminating an obstacle can also be misleading. When the source of 
a problem cannot be directly and immediately addressed, the person facing the problem 
will have to bide their time until they can effectively address the obstacle with purposeful 
action. Obstacles to goals that fall outside of the control of the individual oftentimes 
create negative emotions (for review of secondary control, Morling & Evered, 2006). For 
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example, when dealing with a health emergency, we are often at the mercy of our health 
care providers. The flow of information is limited by the ability of health care 
professionals to consider the results of tests, make a definitive diagnosis, and prescribe 
treatment. Similarly, with interpersonal problems (i.e., when conflict develops with a 
friend or a family member), sometimes we have to wait for the other person to act before 
we can act. In both types of problems, there may be little that we can do to immediately 
fix the problem, so instead we must try to ameliorate the negative emotions that we are 
experiencing. In a way, success in each of these two incidents is defined by one’s ability 
to be patient while they wait for someone else to act (i.e., passive dependence). 
 Successful or effective problem solving sometimes requires that we know when to 
act and when to focus on internal problem appraisal (Blanchard-Fields, 2007; 
Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Lang & Heckhausen, 2001). When faced with emotionally 
evocative problems, especially uncontrollable interpersonal problems, older adults are 
more likely than young adults to implement emotion regulation strategies (Blanchard-
Fields et al., 1995; Blanchard-Fields et al., 2007). Specifically, young adults will try to 
use direct action to fix the problem, but older adults will step back and try to resolve their 
emotions before trying to fix the problem. Temporally speaking, this means that, when 
faced with an uncontrollable problem, one might first use emotion regulation and then 
later implement a more proactive instrumental strategy actually geared towards resolving 
the problem. A participant’s response to the question “What strategy will you use?” will 
depend on where in the process his efforts are currently devoted. Because previous 
studies did not focus on the dynamic nature of problem solving, they might have 
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underestimated older adults’ problem solving effectiveness by inadvertently missing the 
temporal sequence used to implement strategies.  
 One of the strengths of these two experiments, therefore, is that strategy 
implementation was examined as the problem unfolded over time within each round of 
the interactive game. Effective problem solving required the participant to recognize that 
they had to flexibly adapt their choices during the game based on the decisions made by 
their partners. In this way, effective problem solving emerged when a player consistently 
monitored the give-and-take of the game and accommodated their behavior relative to 
their partner’s behavior in pursuit of the game’s objective. When conflict emerged in the 
game, reaching a successful resolution required the participant to attend to their partner’s 
concerns while also looking out for their own interests. Although emotion reactivity and 
regulation were not directly examined, how young and older adults balanced their own 
interests with those of their partner was examined in each experiment. Given past 
research on older adults’ propensity towards emotion regulation, the studies examined 
whether or not older adults would be more willing than young adults to temporarily put 
their own interests aside in order to manage conflicts (i.e., via self-sacrificial cooperation) 
and successfully reach the game’s objective. Moreover, the experiments examined how 
young and older adults adapt to distinctively competitive and cooperative personalities. 
 
2.3 Emotion Regulation Underlies Effective Interpersonal Problem Solving 
 Past problem solving research suggests that, when faced with conflict, older 
adults step back and appraise the situation before acting (Blanchard-Fields, 2007). 
Stepping back from a problem gives a person a chance to do two things (Gross, 2001). 
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First, one can try to control their emotional response to the conflict. Second, one can 
think of a strategy that might help to avoid future conflict and thus future negative 
emotions. Previous research demonstrates that advancing age is associated with an 
increased reluctance to express anger towards others in interpersonal conflicts (Coats & 
Blanchard-Fields, 2008). In the context of interpersonal problems, this may take the form 
of using passive and avoidant strategies to prevent a negative interpersonal situation from 
becoming even worse. Past research demonstrates that older adults use more passive and 
avoidant types of strategies when faced with interpersonal conflict, partially to cope with 
negative emotions (Blanchard-Fields, 2007) and partially to avoid the dissolution of 
social bonds (Birditt & Fingerman, 2005). With advancing age, an individual’s drive to 
achieve competency-oriented goals is supplanted by a desire to be close to friends and 
family and a desire to pass a legacy on to future generations (Diehl, Owen, & 
Youngblade, 2004; McAdams, de St. Aubin, & Logan, 1993). As a result, older adults 
may give greater consideration than young adults to the enduring qualities of 
relationships (Carstensen, 2006). Their affiliative goals may motivate them to be 
sensitive to the needs of others and more tolerant of temporary setbacks in close 
relationships.  
 It is this drive to promote positive interactions with others that should underlie 
older adults’ problem solving effectiveness in the face of interpersonal conflict. Due to 
their communal approach to relationships and their focus on interpersonal harmony, older 
adults may be more likely than young adults to use strategies that foster social bonds 
while avoiding strategies that act to communicate interpersonal displeasure (discussed in 
Blanchard-Fields, 2007). In these two experiments, successful social interaction required 
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that young and older adults cooperate with interactive partners who are sometimes 
selfish. It was expected that, in the face of conflict, older adults’ preference for 
cooperative, affiliative strategies would help them to be more successful than young 
adults, who were predicted to rely more on self-interested motives. This is consistent with 
Blanchard-Fields’s (2007) suggestion that, contrary to popular expectations, passivity is 
oftentimes adaptive in interpersonal problems, and that its use under the appropriate 
circumstances may play a large role in defining success for older adults’ problem solving 
efforts. Key to this argument is the notion that the successful implementation of 
instrumental (i.e., action-oriented) strategies in interpersonal problems requires that both 
parties in a conflict agree to work together (or “it takes two to tango”). Older adults’ 
preference for affiliative goals predisposes them to consider the needs of their partner in a 
conflict and was thus expected to benefit their performance in the two experiments. 
 
2.4 The Limits on Assessing Effectiveness 
 Up to this point, it should be clear that the literature portrays older adults’ 
problem solving abilities in both a positive and negative light. Older adults typically 
demonstrate problem solving deficits when problems are well-defined and of an 
instrumental nature, but they demonstrate superior levels of effectiveness when problems 
are ill-defined and are interpersonal or emotionally-evocative in nature (Blanchard-
Fields, 2007; Heidrich & Denney, 1994; Marsiske & Willis, 1995). This disparity in 
findings suggests that the current techniques for assessing the effective resolution of well-
defined problems provide only a narrow perspective on the strategies that older adults use 
to cope with obstacles to instrumental goals. For instance, recent work by Finucane and 
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colleagues (2002, 2005) demonstrates that older adults display less decision making 
competence than young adults. The authors associated the cause of this deficit with older 
adults’ declining information comprehension abilities and poor inferencing skills. The 
tasks used to assess decision making competence required participants to complete tax 
forms and health insurance applications. It is true that advancing age adversely affects 
reasoning and comprehension abilities, but, when faced with challenges while completing 
forms outside of the lab, older adults might compensate for their cognitive limitations by 
seeking assistance from others (e.g., loved ones or experts in the field).  
 If an older adult sought assistance from another person, the problem space would 
expand to include other people. For example, the older adult might find a trustworthy 
person who was capable of helping. She would then have to develop a strategy for 
interacting with this person to make sure that she could meet the relational demands 
associated with the interaction (e.g., have personal financial information readily 
available, offer time during the day to consult, etc.). The older adult would also have to 
monitor the success of the interaction in order to (a) maintain harmony if things were 
progressing successfully or (b) gradually place distance between herself and the other 
person if the other person was not helpful. Of course, seeking social support is just one 
example of how older adults might choose to cope with an instrumental problem that they 
could not personally solve. How older adults truly cope in this situation is an empirical 
question. However, it is important to keep in mind that, by expanding the breadth of the 
possible solutions that a participant might use to solve a problem, the conclusions that 
one draws about that individual’s problem solving effectiveness might change. 
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 Although research methods used to examine instrumental problems underestimate 
older adults’ problem solving capacity by strictly defining optimal strategy selection, 
those methods used to investigate age differences in interpersonal problem solving 
seldom offer a clear definition of objective success (Thornton & Dumke, 2005). 
Moreover, even though interpersonal problems involve more than one person, successful 
interpersonal problem solving is typically gauged from the perspective of the individual 
who is being asked about the problem. From this person’s point of view, strategies (1) 
that remove the source of contention, (2) that distance the individual from the problem, or 
(3) that ameliorate negative emotions created by the conflict, can all be considered 
effective. It is difficult to objectively define success when it comes to interpersonal 
problems because each participant might have a different goal for the relationship in 
which the conflict occurs. Essentially, to know which strategy truly leads to success, one 
would have to determine if the solutions provided by the participant were appropriate 
given the participant’s personal goal for the relationship (Hoppmann, Coats, & 
Blanchard-Fields, in press).  
 Overall then, each approach to assessing problem solving has it own limitations 
and strengths. On one hand, research on well-defined instrumental problems describes the 
problem solving deficits displayed by older adults when compensatory strategies and 
emotion regulation are not considered viable alternatives (Allaire & Marsiske, 2002). 
Conversely, research on ill-defined interpersonal problems suggests that older adults may 
rely on personal goals to carefully choose those strategies that optimize success when no 
single strategy is optimal (Hoppmann et al., in press).  The current study meshes these 
two approaches to problem solving together by examining the strategies that young and 
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older adults used to manage interpersonal conflict that developed in the context of an 
instrumental task situation.   
 
2.5 Rationale for Studies 
 During interpersonal conflict, relationship partners each bring their own 
individual goals to the problem space. From an experimental standpoint, such goals are 
difficult to control, so individual differences in goals might be examined as a predictor of 
the strategies that a person adopts to manage conflict. Ultimately, each partner wants the 
conflict to be resolved with as positive an outcome as possible. However, there is no 
guarantee that the partners will share the same view on what the most positive outcome is 
or on how to reach this outcome. To standardize the optimal goal state, participants were 
asked to try to reach a well-defined achievement-oriented objective. Each partner was 
individually told to work toward the same goal, and both partners has to work together to 
successfully achieve this objective.  
 Conflict emerged in the interaction if at least one partner deviated from the path 
that led to the most optimal outcome. Once a conflict emerged, task success was 
dependent upon how quickly the partners resolved their differences. Moreover, both 
experiments examined the conditions that led to conflict in this controlled interpersonal 
interaction. Specifically, the interaction task was set up to examine (a) how likely each 
participant was to instigate conflict, and (b) what strategy participants used to manage 
conflict instigated by their interaction partner. Effective problem solving required 
participants to implement strategies that addressed the task-related achievement-oriented 
goal while at the same time fostering cooperation with the interaction partner. Past 
12 
  
research has focused on examining conflict that occurs in interactions with friends and 
family members (e.g., Akiyama, Antonucci, Takahashi, & Langfahl, 2003; Birditt & 
Fingerman, 2003, 2005; Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Krause & Rook, 2003), but 
interpersonal conflict can also involve individuals with whom we do not have enduring 
relationships (e.g., Artistico, Cervone, Pezzuti, 2003; Blanchard-Fields et al., 2007). For 
example, we frequently interact with strangers who provide services that help us to meet 
achievement-oriented goals. Conflict in such interactions can serve as obstacles to our 
goals and to the goals of the service providers. Each study examined age differences in 
interactive behavior in the context of a game (Luce & Raiffa, 1985). Experiment 1 
focused on interactions with strangers, and Experiment 2 focused on interactions with 
friends. To control for between-pairing idiosyncrasies in behavior, participants did not 
actually play with one another. Deception was used to convince players that they were 
playing with human partners when they were actually interacting with computer players 
that were manipulated to simulate specific response strategies.  
 To interact with their partners during the game, players took turns making 
choices. Each choice was rewarded with a specific number of reinforcers. The choice 
made by a given player was dependent upon the previous choice of the other player. That 
is, one player’s choice placed limits on the options that were available to the other player. 
During each turn, participants had to decide between acting cooperatively and acting out 
of self-interest (Axelrod, 1984). Both players were instructed to pursue the same 
objective (i.e., obtain as much of the reinforcer as possible). In the long run, both players 
would collect more of the reinforcer via consistent, mutual cooperation (Aumann, 1959). 
However, individuals could act out of self-interest in order to attempt to achieve a better 
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outcome than the other player (i.e., more of the reinforcer). Given this dynamic, 
individuals could keep a mental record of the past decisions made by the other player in 
order to predict that player’s future decisions (for e.g., see Poundstone, 1992, pp. 106-
121). If one player cooperated, then the other player could have chosen to reciprocate in 
order to establish a track record of cooperation. If one player decided to act out of self-
interest, then the other player could have also chosen to act out of self-interest. The game 
used in both experiments was a form of an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) paradigm. 
In its original form, the PD was a thought-experiment proposed by Albert Tucker (Luce 
& Raiffa, 1985, pp. 94-95) to illustrate how self-interest could inhibit social cooperation 
and lead to negative outcomes when two individuals were faced with a single choice (i.e., 
cooperate or defect) but neither individual was certain of the motives of the other. In the 
iterated version of the PD, players choose one of two options (i.e., behave cooperatively 
or selfishly) in each of several turns such that previous turns influence future turns. This 
affords players a wide variety of strategic options for attempting to steer the game in a 
direction to produce individually and/or mutually favorable outcomes (Aumann, 1959).  
 The version of the iterated PD that was used in these experiments was adapted 
from Rachlin and colleagues’ work (1999, 2000, 2001) exploring the relationship 
between self-control and cooperation. Participants were presented with a game board (see 
Figure 1) and were asked to take turns opening doors using keys. The primary goal of the 
game was to collect as many nickels as possible during each round. The game was 
presented to players in two formats. First, participants played the game by themselves 
(a.k.a., Alone Round). During this round, participants had a chance to explore the game 




Figure 1. Game board used in Nickels coin game. 
 
engaged in interactive play, during which each player’s decisions limited the possible 
decisions that could be made by their partner. One might expect participants to use the 
same strategy that they learned in the Alone Round when playing with others in the 
Interactive Rounds. For Experiment 1, participants were told that they were playing with 
two different same-age strangers who were being tested in another location. For 
Experiment 2, pairs of friends were recruited and told that they would be playing the 
game with one another.  
 During the Alone Round, participants were presented with the game board and 
instructed that each choice that they made would be rewarded with a specific number of 
nickels and a color-coded key that would be used on the next turn. The reward (i.e., key 
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and nickels) found behind each door remained the same during each turn. For example, 
with a yellow key, the participant could open either door found on the top of the game 
board. If the player opened Door A, they received 5 nickels and a yellow key. By opening 
Door B, the player earned 6 nickels and a blue key. Each choice made by the player 
limited his or her options in the next choice to just two doors. If a player was focused on 
the objective of the game, or earning as many nickels as possible in each round, they 
could have first used a yellow key to open Door B to collect 6 nickels and a blue key. On 
the very next turn, however, they would have had to choose between Doors C and D. To 
maximize their total number of nickels, participants needed to focus on the long-run 
instead of focusing on larger immediate rewards. Doors on the right side of the game 
board represented larger immediate rewards, as opening these doors led to the highest 
possible number of nickels in any given turn (i.e., Door D’s 2 nickels > Door C’s 1 
nickel; Door B’s 6 nickels > Door A’s 5 nickels). Choosing the doors on the right came at 
a cost. By choosing Door B over A, a player was forced to choose between the bottom 
two doors on their next turn, and would thus forgo at least 3 nickels (i.e., 5 nickels from 
Door A less 2 nickels from Door D). This meant that a player who opened Door B would 
be strongly motivated to open Door C on their next turn so as to collect a yellow key and 
once again be able to choose from the top two doors.  
 In previous work, players typically discovered that the optimal solution was to 
always choose Door A after a few turns in the Alone Round (Brown & Rachlin, 1999). A 
failure to rely on this strategy was associated with having low self-control, as the larger 
immediate reward (e.g., rewards behind Doors B and D > rewards behind Doors A and C, 
respectively) was too tempting to pass up (Rachlin, 2000). A failure to discover the 
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optimal solution was also related to one’s inability to reason through the situation and 
understand how best to achieve the game’s objective. Given this, the Alone Round format 
of the game resembled well-defined instrumental problems used in the past to study 
instrumental everyday problem solving. Specifically, to meet the game’s objective, 
participant had to rely on their cognitive skills to figure out the optimal strategy (i.e., 
choosing doors on the left side of game board promote largest gain). Previous research on 
the PD has not focused on the performance of older adult samples, but advancing age has 
been associated with gains in self-control as indexed by a reduction of the discounting of 
delayed rewards (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999). 
Assuming that older adults developed a proper understanding of the game’s instructions 
in each experiment, they should be just as able as young adults to determine the optimal 
strategy for collecting nickels. However, age-related differences could still emerge in this 
game if more young adults use the optimal strategy than older adults. The critical test of 
game comprehension emerged in each experiment when examining change in 
performance between the Alone Round and the Interactive Rounds. At this juncture, 
participants were forced to consider how their choices influenced their partner’s success.  
 During interactive play, each player’s decision as to which door to open 
influenced the subsequent decision that was made by the other player. Specifically, when 
a player opened a door using a key, that player collected the nickels found behind that 
door but gave the key to the other player. Although participants determined that it was 
important to choose from the yellow doors to obtain the most nickels, whether or not they 
consistently chose Door A (and returned a yellow key to their partner) was dependent 
upon what the participant inferred the other player’s intentions were. Ultimately, the best 
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possible outcome occurred when both players cooperated and exclusively chose Door A. 
However, the moment that one player acted purely out of self-interest, the other player 
became suspicious of that player’s motives and lost confidence in that player’s ability to 
cooperate. In both experiments, successful social interaction required that the participants 
kept their own interests in mind while also being mindful of those of their interaction 
partner. If one partner failed to reciprocate sensitivity to mutual interest, conflict erupted 
and each partner then struggled to control the situation.  
 There were two ways in which a person could immediately react to conflict 
created by their partner (i.e., partner chose Door B). First, some participants chose to 
retaliate by also making a selfish choice when it was their turn (i.e., Door D). By doing 
this, the participant communicated to the other player that selfish choices would be 
reciprocated with selfish choices. The second response that was displayed in the face of 
conflict was to continue to cooperate despite the fact that the selfish partner could very 
well choose to remain selfish (i.e., Door C). By doing this, the participant communicated 
to the selfish partner that they were not motivated to out perform him or her but instead 
wanted to get the best score that they could for themselves through cooperation. The first 
reaction was considered to be more confrontational in nature because the participant was 
proactive in punishing the selfish partner for deviant, selfish behavior. The second 
reaction was considered to be more passive because the participant was allowing the 
other player to determine how much success each of them would have.  
 In addition to these immediate reactions, participants also developed more long-
term strategies for how to behave. For example, after being taken advantage of by their 
partner, some participants feigned a willingness to cooperate in order to make selfish 
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choices themselves the first chance that they got (i.e., Participant chose C, partner chose 
A, participant chose B; a.k.a. “getting even”). Other participants decided to cooperate 
even after their partner was uncooperative on more than two occasions. Once again, the 
former was considered to be a more confrontational strategy because it involved 
deliberately creating a situation to try to make one’s partner feel the same type of 
frustration experienced by the participant. However, the latter was considered more 
passive as the participant gives the selfish partner multiple chances to reconcile and 
cooperate. Ultimately, flexible strategy implementation occurred during the game when 
the participant adapted their strategy over time to match the cooperative tendencies of the 
interaction partners. In so doing, a person would maximize their earnings. 
 Interpersonal problems occur when an obstacle emerges in a relationship or 
interaction between two or more individuals. In theses two experiments, obstacles were 
examined at two different levels of interpersonal closeness. In Experiment 1, conflict was 
induced between strangers by programming computer-simulated strangers to be selfish 
(i.e., act out of self-interest) on a fixed proportion of the trials. Likewise, in Experiment 
2, conflict was induced between friends by programming a computer-simulated friend to 
be selfish on a fixed proportion of the trials. In both experiments, if the participant 
established a reciprocal pattern of cooperation with the computer-simulated player, 
conflict emerged when the computer player deviated from this pattern and prevented the 
participant from obtaining the game’s objective.  
 The main purpose of these two experiments was to provide an initial examination 
of the ways in which young and older adults reacted to conflict that emerged when 
cooperation broke down in interactions with strangers and friends. Because conflict in 
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relationships is typically bi-directional, the likelihood that participants would instigate 
conflict themselves when their partner did not first instigate it was also examined. Again, 
participants interacted with computer-simulated strangers (Experiment 1) and friends 
(Experiment 2), but, in this condition, these partners did not cause conflict. Differences in 
the likelihood of instigating conflicts with strangers as opposed to friends were examined 
for young and older adults using cross-study comparisons. Finally, in Experiment 1, 
participants played the game with two strangers: one who was programmed to break 
patterns of mutual cooperation and one who was programmed to always reciprocate the 
participant’s choice (i.e., if the participant was selfish, then the computer was selfish; if 
the participant was cooperative, then the computer was cooperative). The order with 
which participants played each of the computer players was manipulated to examine 




EXPERIMENT 1 - INTERACTING WITH STRANGERS 
 
3.1 Overview of Experiment 1 
  Findings from life span developmental research on interpersonal problem solving 
suggest that advancing age is associated with a greater flexibility in problem solving 
strategy use (Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Blanchard-Fields et al., 2007). Older adults are 
more likely than young adults to include emotion regulation strategies in their reactions 
to interpersonal strife (Blanchard-Fields et al., 1995, 1997; Blanchard-Fields, Stein, & 
Watson, 2004). Moreover, the strategies that they select are better suited for meeting the 
affiliative goals that they have for their relationships (Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Hoppmann 
et al., in press). Specifically, the strategies adopted by older adults are more likely to 
diffuse interpersonal tension than those selected by young adults (Birditt & Fingerman, 
2005). In interpersonal problems, confrontation and emotional venting may further ignite 
the emotions of the other person involved, and thus may be destructive to relationships 
(Birditt & Fingerman, 2005). When faced with an uncontrollable interpersonal problem, 
older adults are more likely to passively withdraw from the problem. By doing this, they 
can avoid escalating the conflict and focus instead on more instrumental solutions. 
Conversely, young adults will often invest more time and energy into managing the cause 
of the problem than into trying to resolve the negative emotions created by the conflict. 
When they do try to resolve their negative emotions, young adults are more likely to use 
confrontive strategies that might make achieving instrumental goals more difficult 
(Blanchard-Fields, 2007). When taken together, these findings suggest that older adults 
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are more attuned to maintaining harmony in relationships than are young adults, and that 
older adults may use more passive behaviors (e.g., withdrawal) to allow the tension that 
builds during a conflict to subside. As mentioned earlier, older adults’ use of passive 
strategies may actually be effective because they are more appropriate for the context of 
the problem (Blanchard-Fields, 2007).  
 In Experiment 1, young and older adults played one round of an iterated PD game 
alone and then two rounds with two different computer-simulated strangers. Participants 
first played by themselves to become familiar with the game. In the Interactive Rounds, 
one of the strangers reciprocated the participant’s behavior 100% of the time using a Tit-
for-Tat (TFT) strategy (a.k.a., TFT Stranger). The other stranger reciprocated the 
participant’s behavior in 75% of the trials, but, during the remaining 25%, this stranger 
made selfish, or the self-interested, choices (a.k.a., Selfish Stranger). In past experiments, 
young adults were able to predict the behavior of the TFT Stranger 100% of the time, but 
had more difficulty in predicting the behavior of the Selfish Stranger (Baker & Rachlin, 
2001). These two programs were adopted in both experiments as a way to manipulate the 
cooperative intent of the computer-simulated players. Participants interacted with 
strangers by taking turns opening doors in the iterated PD game, and their level of 
cooperation was monitored as the main dependent variable. Cooperative responses 
involved choosing to open Door A or Door C because each of these choices required the 
player to forgo a larger immediate reward to obtain a larger average gain in the long run. 
At the end of each round, participants were asked to describe the goal that they had in 
mind for that round and to characterize the personal qualities of the other player. 
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 Although interpersonal interactions between older adults and their friends and 
family members have been the focus of much research, how older adults spontaneously 
interact with strangers has yet to be examined. Friends and family members do represent 
important components of older adults’ social support mechanism. Nevertheless, older 
adults come into contact with novel social partners (i.e., strangers) on a regular basis. For 
example, a stranger may provide a service that helps an older adult meet an instrumental 
goal. Given this possibility, it is important to consider how older adults go about 
interacting with strangers and how older adults might cope with conflicts when strangers 
fail to act in their interest. Because older adults develop distinct preferences for close 
social partners that provide emotionally meaningful interactions, their mechanism for 
selecting friendly partners, and even friendly strangers, may be more sensitive than that 
of young adults (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Experiment 1 was designed to 
provide some insight into this selection mechanism by characterizing how young and 
older adults reacted to one stranger who was selfish and one who was open to 
cooperation. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses for Experiment 1 
 The hypotheses for Experiment 1 are broken down into three groups: those where 
age should not matter (age non-specific), those where age should matter (age specific), 
and those that are more exploratory in nature (exploratory).  
 
3.2.1 Age Non-Specific Hypotheses 
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 Because the TFT Stranger was more consistently willing to consider the mutual 
interest of both players than the Selfish Stranger, all participants were expected to display 
a greater percentage of cooperative behavior for the TFT Stranger than for the Selfish 
Stranger (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, while playing the TFT Stranger, participants were 
expected to discover that this stranger was willing to cooperate, so cooperative behavior 
was predicted to increase over time (Hypothesis 2). Conversely, while playing the Selfish 
player, participants were expected to respond to the broken pattern of cooperation by 
being less cooperative (Hypothesis 3). The change in cooperation over time predicted in 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 were operationalized by tracking the percentage of time that each 
participant displayed cooperative behavior (i.e., chooses Doors A or C) in eight 
successive 4-turn blocks during the course of each 32-turn round. Finally, given that 
participants were expected to display more cooperative behavior toward the TFT Stranger 
than the Selfish Stranger, they were predicted to have more favorable impressions of the 
TFT Stranger (Hypothesis 4). To test this hypothesis, participants’ trait ratings for the 
other player’s personal characteristics were collected after each round and then 
comparisons were made between the TFT Stranger and Selfish Stranger. 
 
3.2.2 Age Specific Hypotheses 
 Because advancing age was associated with increased self-control and with an 
increased prioritization of relationship harmony in previous research, older adults were 
predicted to be less likely than young adults to instigate conflict (i.e., make self-interested 
choices) when playing with the TFT Stranger. In other words, older adults were expected 
to be more likely than young adults to cooperate (i.e., choose Doors A or C) with 
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strangers who do not initiate a deviation from the rules of reciprocal exchange 
(Hypothesis 5). Also, given their more passive approach to interpersonal conflict, on 
average older adults were predicted to use fewer turns to punish the Selfish Stranger after 
this player acted out of self-interest (Hypothesis 6). This hypothesis was tested by 
examining the frequency of selfish behavior (i.e., choosing Doors B or D) displayed by 
young and older adults immediately after the first time the Selfish Stranger behaved in a 
selfish way. It was expected that once a conflict emerged, young adults would focus on 
fixing the deviant behavior of the Selfish Stranger and thus punish the Selfish Stranger 
via reciprocal selfishness (i.e., choosing Doors B or D), whereas older adults were 
expected to punish the Selfish Stranger more sparingly (i.e., choose Doors B or D less 
often than young adults) so that they could capitalize on those turns that the Selfish 
Stranger actually did reciprocate (75%) to collect more nickels. In other words, older 
adults were predicted to focus on the Selfish Stranger’s less-than-perfect willingness to 
cooperate, but young adults were expected to focus on the Selfish Stranger’s willingness 
to behave selfishly. Additional confirmation for this was also sought by examining the 
goals that young and older adults reported they had in mind during each of the rounds of 
interactive play (Hypothesis 7).  
 Young adults’ insensitivity to the Selfish Stranger’s willingness to cooperate was 
predicted to lead to two possible side effects for their behavior during the game. First, 
when young adults interacted with the Selfish Stranger before the TFT Stranger, the 
earlier experience was expected to bias their choices toward selfishness (i.e., choosing 
Doors B or D) when later playing with the TFT Stranger (Hypothesis 8). To test this 
hypothesis, overall cooperation in each round was examined with order of play acting as 
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a between-subjects factor. Some participants played with the TFT Stranger first, others 
played play with the TFT Stranger after first playing the Selfish Stranger. Second, young 
adults were predicted to have a more negative impression of the TFT Stranger when 
playing the TFT Stranger after the Selfish Stranger rather than before (Hypothesis 9). 
Older adults were expected to be more sensitive than young adults to the differences in 
the behavioral tendencies of the TFT and Selfish Strangers. As a result, older adults were 
predicted to collect more nickels than young adults and thus more effectively resolve 
interpersonal conflict (Hypothesis 10).  
 
3.2.3 Exploration of Individual Differences 
 In addition to collecting data on the iterated PD task, participants were asked to 
complete questionnaires assessing individual differences in personality, competitiveness, 
locus of control, preference for antecedent- (i.e., reappraisal) and response- (i.e., 
suppression) focused emotion regulation, interpersonal flexibility, interpersonal trust, 
coping flexibility, future time perspective, generativity, agentic and communal values, 
and one’s propensity to engage in life management strategies. In order to get a better 
understanding of the factors that predict effective interpersonal problem solving, scores 
on these measures were examined for possible relationships to the overall level of 
cooperative behavior. Also examined were relationships between cooperation in the game 
and the participants’ gender and level of cognitive functioning. 
 




 Young and older adult participants played an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
(PD) first alone and then with each of two distinct fictional strangers. One stranger was 
programmed to reciprocate the participant’s choices 100% of the time (a.k.a. Tit-for-Tat, 
or TFT, stranger). The other stranger resembled the TFT stranger some of the time, but 
also displayed self-interested behavior (a.k.a. Selfish player). The order with which 
participants interacted with these two computer programs was counterbalanced. Of 
primary interest were (a) the degree to which participants would cooperate with the 
strangers during the game and (b) the accumulated reward (i.e., nickels that participants 
were able to accrue). Also examined were the participants’ impressions of the strangers 
and their self-reported goals for the interactive round of the game. 
Participants 
 Eighty-one young (ages 18-28; M = 19.9, SE = 0.2; 44% women) and 72 older 
adults (ages 58-82; M = 70.1, SE = 0.8; 54% women) were recruited to participate in this 
experiment. Participants were predominantly Caucasian (71%; African American = 11%, 
Asian = 9%, Other = 10%). Relative to young adults, older adults reported being in worse 
overall health, t(148) = 2.83, p < .001, and felt that their health problems were more 
likely to get in the way of their daily activities, t(147) = 3.40, p < .01 (Young overall 
health: M = 3.95, SE = 0.09; Old overall health: M = 3.57, SE = 0.11; Young health 
problems: M = 1.53; SE = 0.09; Old health problems: M = 2.00, SE = 0.11). Older adults 
(M = 21.9, SE = 0.9) obtained a higher vocabulary score than did young adults (M = 17.4, 
SE = 0.5), t(147) = 4.27, p < .001, but young adults obtained higher scores in inductive 
reasoning (Letter Sets; Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976) and processing 
speed (Digit-Symbols Matching; Salthouse, 1992) than did older adults, t(149) = 8.16 (p 
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< .001) and t(149) = 12.02 (p < .001), respectively (Young Letter Sets: M = 23.3, SE = 
0.4; Old Letter Sets: M = 17.1, SE = 0.7; Young Speed: M = 65.5, SE = 1.2; Old Speed: 




 3.3.2.1 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Game. The iterated PD game adapted 
for this experiment (Brown & Rachlin, 1999) asked players to take turns opening doors in 
order to collect nickels. Doors were color-coded with the key that was needed to open 
them. Blue keys opened blue doors, and yellow keys opened yellow doors. See Figure 1 
for a graphic depiction of the game board. The objective of the game was to collect as 
many nickels as possible in each round. Each round consisted of 32 turns; however, 
participants were unaware of this and were told that each round would end after some 
randomly-determined number of turns. Participants played the first round by themselves 
(Alone Round) and then played two rounds with strangers (Interactive Rounds). 
Participants started off each round with a yellow key and were asked to choose between 
opening Door A or Door B. When a participant opened a door in the Alone Round (see 
Figure 2 for a depiction of a trial in the Alone Round), they collected the key and the 
nickels found behind that door (i.e., shown in the window at the bottom of the door). 
After each turn, the game board was reset and the participant was free to open any door 
that matched the color of the key that they had just obtained in the previous turn. In the 
Interactive Rounds, when a player opened a door, that player kept the nickels found 
behind the door but gave the key that they uncovered to the other player. The other player 
28 
  
would then use this key to open a door during their turn (see Figure 3 for a depiction of a 
trial in the Interactive Rounds), collecting the nickels behind the door of their choice and 
passing the accompanying key to the other player. The optimal strategy for all rounds 
was to consistently choose Door A, yielding an average gain of five nickels per turn.  
 
 
Figure 2. Appearance of the game during the Alone Round. 
 
 In conjunction with each round of the game, participants completed a few 
questionnaires. First, after each round, participants were asked to briefly describe the goal 
that they had in mind while playing the game in that round. Second, immediately prior to 
the first Interactive Round, participants were asked to describe the strategy that they felt 
would maximize the number of nickels that a person could collect in that round. These 
questions were posed to assess the participants’ approach to and frame of mind during the 
Interactive Rounds. Responses were coded for the degree to which they reflected each 
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participant’s competitive or cooperative intentions. Finally, after each Interactive Round, 
participants made trait attributions about the stranger with whom they had just interacted  
 
 
Figure 3. Appearance of the game during an Interactive Round. 
 
by indicating the extent to which they agreed that the stranger displayed each of 25 
personal characteristics (i.e., likeable, intelligent, kind, trustworthy, charitable, friendly, 
honest, competent, loyal, passive, selfish, stubborn, unfaithful, annoying, uncaring, lazy, 
inexperienced, hostile, independent, cooperative, competitive, impulsive, curious, 
masculine, and feminine; rating: 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
 All rounds of the iterated PD game were played on computers using E-prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, USA) that had been programmed to 
create the feel of a turn-based game setting. During the Interactive Rounds, the 
participants received feedback from the computer-programmed strangers in such a way to 
make it appear that a real human was taking time to make a response. The computer’s 
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response time randomly varied between 2 to 6 seconds for young adults and 2 to 10 
seconds for older adults. The program for the TFT Stranger reciprocated the behavior of 
the participant on every turn (i.e., if receive a yellow key, then pass a yellow key). 
However, the program for the Selfish Stranger reciprocated the participant’s choices on 
only 75% of the turns. During the Selfish Stranger’s first two turns, the computer 
reciprocated the participant’s choices to create the illusion of being willing to cooperate 
and also to allow for the possibility that the participant would defect before the Selfish 
Stranger did. However, during eight of the 30 remaining turns, the Selfish Stranger would 
pass a blue key regardless of the participant’s pattern of choices (i.e., choose Door B if 
Selfish Stranger has a yellow key or choose Door D if Selfish Stranger has a blue key). 
These defections were randomly distributed, and each participant’s responses were 
examined to determine the number of times that the participant noticed the Selfish 
Stranger’s defections.  
 3.3.2.2 Individual Difference Measures. Prior to the experimental session, 
participants were asked to complete a packet of surveys and questionnaires. These global 
measures assessed each participant’s social and personal goals and tendencies. This 
battery of measures was included to explore how such intra- and interpersonal 
characteristics would relate to performance in the iterated PD game. Included in the 
packet were measures of interpersonal flexibility, coping flexibility, emotion suppression, 
emotion reappraisal, future time perspective, generativity, locus of control, agentic and 
communal values, interpersonal trust, interpersonal control strivings, personality 
dimensions (i.e., conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism, extraversion, and 





 Participants were recruited from the student population at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology and from the Atlanta metropolitan community to take part in a study 
examining how people interact with others while playing a computer game. Participants 
completed a packet of individual difference questionnaires (described above and in 
Appendix A) prior to the laboratory session. Sessions were conducted with one or two 
participants per session. Participants were told that they would play multiple rounds of a 
computer game called “Nickels”, and that two additional same-age participants (i.e., 
anonymous strangers) were simultaneously taking part in this experiment in another 
testing location with another experimenter. No information (e.g., gender) was given to the 
participants about the strangers. Participants were told that the experimenters who were 
conducting the session at each testing location would coordinate the game by 
communicating with one another using a Voice-Over-IP program (e.g., Skype). When 
sessions included two participants, the participants were reassured that they would only 
be playing with strangers during the interactive rounds and that they would never play the 
game with one another. Participants were then instructed as to how to play the computer 
game.  
 Participants were first instructed as to the rules of the Alone Round (see Appendix 
B for the instructions that were read to the participants before playing the Alone Round). 
Briefly, participants were informed (a) that they would be collecting nickels by making 
sequential decisions to open doors using keys (i.e., blue keys open blue doors, and yellow 
keys open yellow doors), (b) that the decision to open a door in one turn impacted the 
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next turn by giving you a new key that limited your next choice, and (c) that their 
objective was to obtain as many nickels as possible during the round. After completing a 
short practice round, participants were left alone to complete the Alone Round of the 
game. At the end of the round, participants were asked to indicate which strategy a 
person would use if they wanted to maximize the number of nickels that they earned in 
that round. 
 Next, participants were instructed on the game format for the Interactive Rounds 
(see Appendix B for the instructions that were read to the participants before playing the 
Interactive Rounds). Participants were told (a) that they had the same objective as in the 
Alone Round, to earn as many nickels as possible, (b) that their choices (as well as those 
of the strangers with whom they were playing) would be limited by the color of the key 
that they were passed when the strangers made their choices, and (c) that they should let 
the experimenter know immediately if there was a connectivity problem between their 
computer and that of the stranger with whom they were playing. No allusions to 
cooperating (e.g., “partner”) or competing (i.e., “opponent”) were made in the 
instructions. If participants asked questions about the intentions of the strangers with 
whom they were playing, the experimenter responded with an ambiguous, non-evaluative 
response (e.g., “Each person has to use their own judgment when making choices. It is up 
to each of you.”). Just prior to starting the first Interactive Round, participants were once 
again asked to indicate which strategy a person might use to maximize the number of 
nickels that they earned in the round. Participants were then left alone to complete each 
Interactive Round. After each round, participants were asked to indicate what their 
objective was while playing. They were also asked to provide their impression of each 
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stranger by rating the stranger on 25 personal traits. Once the rounds of the iterated PD 
game were completed, cognitive abilities tests were administered, and participants were 
probed for their suspicion about the deception used during the game. Afterwards, 
participants were debriefed as to the purpose of the experiment, and all deception 
involved was disclosed. Participants were also asked to verify that it was acceptable to 
use their data given the deceptive method used to obtain them. 
 
3.4 Results for Experiment 1 
3.4.1 Overview 
 This study used a 2 (Age Group: young and older adults) by 2 (Stranger Type: 
Tit-for-Tat and Selfish program) by 2 (Player Order: Tit-for-Tat first and Tit-for-Tat 
second) by 8 (Time: turns 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, 13-16, 17-20, 21-24, 25-28, and 29-32) mixed-
model design. Age Group and Player Order were between-subjects factors, whereas 
Stranger Type and Time were within-subjects factors. The main dependent variables were 
(a) the extent to which participants made cooperative choices (i.e., choose doors that pass 
yellow keys; Doors A and C) during the iterated PD game, (b) the trait ratings that the 
participants provided for each of the two strangers after playing with them, (c) the 
number of nickels that the participants earned during each interactive round of the game, 
and (d) the participants’ self-reported goals for the interactive rounds of the game. Unless 
otherwise noted, an α = .05 level was used for all of the statistical tests reported below.1  
 
3.4.2 Do Young and Older Adults Learn the Main Point of the Game in the Alone Round? 
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  Given that the best possible strategy for this experiment’s iterated PD game 
involves choosing a yellow door and obtaining yellow keys on every turn, optimal 
performance was gauged by the percentage of time that the participant chose either Door 
A or Door C. When playing with a partner, this reflected a percentage of cooperation 
with the partner. When playing alone, this proportion reflected a form of self-
cooperation, or self-control, where the participant was willing to forgo a large reward in 
one turn for more consistent long-term gains. To be able to compare young and older 
adult behavior in the interactive round, it was essential that members of both age groups 
could learn to perform well on the task. 
  Proportion of cooperation (i.e., the percentage of times that Doors A or C were 
chosen) were calculated for each participant for each round as (1) a round total including 
all 32 turns and (2) eight 4-turn blocks. A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Player Order) x 8 (Time) 
mixed model ANOVA conducted on the participants’ percentage of cooperation in the 
Alone Round revealed that main effects of Time, F(7,924) = 5.80, η2 = .04, and Age 
Group F(1,132) = 20.73, η2 = .14 were qualified by a significant Time x Age Group 
interaction F(7,924) = 3.21, η2 = .02. As depicted in Figure 4, the interaction was driven 
by older adults’ significant improvement in the game over time. For example, the contrast 
between older adults’ first and last 4-turn blocks revealed a significant difference in 
performance, t(64) = 2.28 (Mdiff = 0.12, SE = 0.04) . Young adults remained stable in their 
performance and outperformed older adults at every time point during the Alone Round. 
Both age groups demonstrated average performance that fell between 66.7% and 100% 
cooperation, suggesting that both groups (a) chose Doors A and C more frequently than 
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Doors B and D, and (b) chose Door A multiple times in a row (e.g., A-A-B-C), and thus 
were likely to experience noticeable defections with the Selfish Stranger.2  
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of cooperation in the Alone Round of Experiment 1 for each of the 
eight 4-turn blocks, displayed separately for young and older adults. 
 
3.4.3 Average Cooperation Declines between the Alone Round and Interactive Rounds 
for Both Age Groups 
 Although young adults outperformed older adults in the Alone Round, both age 
groups experienced decline in performance when shifting from the Alone Round to the 
Interactive Rounds. A 2 (Age Group) x 3 (Round: Alone, TFT, and Selfish) x 2 (Player 
Order) mixed model ANOVA conducted on the total percentage of cooperation across all 
32 turns in each round yielded a main effect of Round, F(2,264) = 98.60, η2 = .43, a 
Round x Age Group interaction, F(2,264) = 6.33, η2 = .04, and a marginal Round x 
Player Order x Age Group interaction, F(2,264) = 2.66, η2 = .02, p < .08. The results of 
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within-subjects contrasts comparing performance between rounds suggested that both 
young and older adults displayed less cooperation in each of the two Interactive Rounds 
than in the Alone Round: Alone (M = 0.78, SE = 0.02) versus TFT (M = 0.49, SE = 0.04), 
F(1,132) = 54.39, η2 = .29; Alone versus Selfish (M = 0.29, SE = 0.02), F(1,132) = 
300.43, η2 = .70. Moreover, as depicted in Figure 5a, a within-subjects Round x Age 
Group interaction contrast also revealed that young adults displayed a steeper decline in 
cooperation between the Alone Round and the Selfish Interactive Round than did older 
adults, F(1,132) = 19.46, η2 = .13.3 Finally, the marginal Round x Player Order x Age 
Group interaction emerged because older adults displayed a higher level of cooperation 
when they interacted with the Selfish Stranger first (i.e., immediately after the Alone 
Round) in the Interactive Round (M = 0.40, SE = 0.05) rather than second (i.e., 
immediately after the TFT Stranger; M = 0.26, SE = 0.04), t(63) = 2.11. Figure 5b 
displays the mean performance of young and older adults in each round of play separately 
by Player Order. Consistent with the age non-specific hypotheses (Hypothesis 1), all 
participants cooperated more with the TFT Stranger than the Selfish Stranger. However, 
inconsistent with the age specific hypotheses, older and young adults displayed 
equivalent average cooperation when interacting with the TFT Stranger. Older adults 
were predicted to be more cooperative than young adults with the TFT Stranger 
(Hypothesis 5).  
 
3.4.4 Cooperation Remains Stable with TFT Stranger but Declines with Selfish Stranger 
 When playing the iterated PD game with each of the two strangers, young and 








Figure 5. (a) Average total percentage of cooperation for each round of Experiment 1, 
displayed separately for young and older adults. (b) Average total percentage of 
cooperation for each round of Experiment 1, displayed separately by player order for 
young and older adults. 
38 
  
round. A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Stranger Type) x 2 (Player Order) mixed model ANOVA 
conducted on mean level of cooperation across all 32 turns in each round revealed that a 
main effect of Stranger Type, F(1,132) = 29.38, η2 = .18, was qualified by a marginal 
Stranger Type x Age Group interaction, F(1,132) = 3.65, η2 = .03, p < .06, and a 
marginal Stranger Type x Player Order x Age Group interaction, F(1,132) = 2.90, η2 = 
.02, p < .10. Consistent with age non-specific predictions (Hypothesis 1) and already 
mentioned above, the main effect of Stranger Type demonstrated that young and older 
adults cooperated more with the TFT Stranger (M = 0.49, SE = 0.04) than with the Selfish 
Stranger (M = 0.29, SE = 0.02). The marginal Stranger Type x Age Group and Stranger 
Type x Player Order x Age Group interactions emerged because, older adults cooperated 
more with the Selfish Stranger when that stranger was played in the first of the two 
Interactive Rounds than in the second. This difference boosted the older adults’ mean 
overall level of cooperation with the Selfish player (M = 0.33, SE = 0.03) to be 
marginally greater than that of the young adults (M = 0.26, SE = 0.03), t(134) = 1.64 (p < 
.11), hence the marginal interaction reported in the above section.4 
 In addition to examining participants’ overall performance in the Interactive 
Rounds, separate 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Player Order) x 8 (Time) mixed model ANOVAs 
were conducted on the participants’ eight consecutive 4-turn blocks to determine if (a) 
cooperation with the TFT Stranger improved over time (i.e., assuming that the participant 
became increasingly aware of the reciprocating nature of the TFT Stranger) and (b) 
cooperation with the Selfish Stranger decreased over time (i.e., assuming that the 
participant would become less cooperative as the Stranger takes advantage of them). The 
ANOVA on cooperation with the TFT Stranger did not reveal any significant main 
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effects or interactions, and thus failed to support the age non-specific prediction 
(Hypothesis 2) that all participants would become more cooperative with the TFT 
Stranger over time. The ANOVA on cooperation with the Selfish Stranger revealed a 
main effect of Time, F(7,924) = 30.30, η2 = .19, and an Age Group x Player Orde








2 = .04. Consistent with age non-specific predictions 
(Hypothesis 3), the main effect of Time was driven by a decrease in cooperation with 
Selfish Stranger over time. Within-subjects contrasts comparing mean performance 
between each 4-turn block showed that cooperation dropped between block 1 and block 
2, F(1,132) = 30.52, η2 = .19, between block 2 and block 3, F(1,132) = 4.79, η2 = .04, 
marginally between block 3 and block 4, F(1,132) = 2.62, η2 = .02, p < .08, and then 
significantly again between block 5 and block 6, F(1,132) = 8.27, η2 = .06. As discu
above, the Age Group x Player Order interaction emerged because older adults 
cooperated more with the Selfish Stranger computer program when they interact
before the TFT Stranger program. Mean levels of cooperation at each time point for each 
of the Interactive Rounds are displayed in Figure 6.5
 
3.4.5 Examination of Distributions Revealed More Cooperation with TFT Stranger than
with Selfish Stranger 
 Although the results thus far suggest that the mean level of cooperation was 
higher when participants interacted with the TFT Stranger than with the Selfish Stran
it is worth noting that the mean levels of performance can be deceiving. Figure 7 d
histograms for young and older adults’ overall cooperation during each of the Interactive 






Figure 6. Percentage of cooperation in the Interactive Rounds of Experiment 1 for each 












Figure 7. Histograms of average total percentage of cooperation frequency counts for the 
ent 1, displayed separately by stranger type for young and 
lder adults. 
 






appears that about 73% of the young adults and 43% of the older adults chose either to 
cooperate or to defect 100% of the time. When interacting with the Selfish Stranger, this 
tendency to stick with the same response for every turn was attenuated (Young = 32%; 
Old = 21%). For both Stranger Types, young and older adults’ mean levels of cooperation 
tended not to be normally distributed. To further examine possible differences in young 
and older adults’ behavior when interacting with strangers (e.g., are young adults more 
likely than older adults to choose to pass the blue key for every of the round), mean 
cooperation for each individual was categorized as 100% Cooperation, 100% Defection, 
or “Somewhere in between” for each Stranger Type. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests were 
conducted for each age group to determine if membership in these categories differed by 
Stranger Type, a paired samples variable. For both young adults and older adults, there 
were significantly more individuals who displayed more cooperative behavior when 
interacting with the TFT Stranger than when interacting with the Selfish Stranger 
(Young: ZSelfish-TFT = -2.59, p < .01; Old: Z  = -2.34, p < .05).6 Given that young 
and older adults displayed consistent cooperative behavior more often when interacting 
with the TFT Stranger than with the Selfish Stranger, chi-square tests were conducted 
separately by Stranger Type to determine if young and older adults differed at all in their 
distributions of cooperative behavior. For the TFT Stranger, young and older adults 
significantly differed in their behavior, χ2(2) = 13.11, n = 136, p < .01, such that young 
adults were more likely to act at either extreme while older adults less frequently chos
ewhere in between” = 57%, and 100% Defection = 23%). For the Selfish Stranger, 
Selfish-TFT
e to 
cooperate or defect 100% of the time (Young: 100% Cooperation = 39%, “Somewhere in 











categorization scheme, χ2(2) = 2.84, n = 136, p > .24 (Young: 100% Cooperation = 1%,
“Somewhere in between” = 68%, and 100% Defection = 31%; Old: 100% Cooperation = 
2%, “Somewhere in between” = 80%, and 100% Defection = 19%). Consistent with age
non-specific hypotheses (Hypothesis 1), these findings suggest that young adults and 
older adults were both more cooperative with the TFT Stranger than the Selfish Stranger 
but that older adults less frequently relied on maintaining a consistent pattern of 
decisions. 
 
3.4.6 Age-Related Differences in Turn-by-Turn Behavior during Interactive PD Rounds 
 In order to determine if older adults were less confrontational than young adults 
after being taken advantage of by the Selfish Stranger, each participant’s responses were
examined to determine (a) the overall number of times that the Selfish Stranger chose to 
pass a blue key after the participant had passed this stranger a yellow key (a.k.a., 
noticeable defections), (b) the number of consecutive times that the participant passed th
Selfish Stranger a blue key after this stranger’s first noticeable defection (a.k.a., 
punishing), and (c) the likelihood that that the participant decided to choose Door B aft
forgiving the Selfish Stranger’s first noticeable defection (a.k.a. getting even). A 2 (Age 
Group) x 2 (Player Order) between-subjects ANOVA on the number of noticeable 
defections experienced during the Interactive Round with the Selfish Stranger revealed 
that a main effect of Age Group, F(1,132) = 4.31, η2 = .03, was qualified by an Age 
Group x Player Order interaction, F(1,132) = 3.97, η2 = .03. Although young (M = 2.15, 
SE = 0.37) and older adults (M = 2.18, SE = 0.37) experienced the same number
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noticeable defections when they played the Selfish Stranger second in the Interactive 
Rounds, t(64) = 0.06, ns, older adults (M = 3.19, SE = 0.38) experienced more noticeab
defections from the Selfish Stranger program than did young adults (M = 1.68, SE = 0.35
when they played this program first, t(68) = 2.79. Also, older adults experienced 
marginally more noticeable defections from the Selfish Stranger when playing this 
program first as compared with second, t(63) = 1.79, p < .08, whereas the order of play
did not impact the number of noticeable defections experienced by young adults t(69) = 






t the participant punished the Selfish Stranger after the first noticeable 







2.58, η2 = .03, p < .12. Consistent with initial predictions (Hypothesis 6), older adults (M
=  SE = 1.15) punished the Selfish Stranger on fewer consecutive turns than did 
young adults (M = 6.08, SE = 1.17) after the first noticeable defection. Finally, a chi-
square test revealed that equal proportions of young (53%) and older adults (44%) chose 
to get even with the Selfish Stranger (i.e., choose Door B) after having chosen Do
following this stranger’s first noticeable defection, χ2(1) = 0.56, n = 66, p > . 45. These 
findings suggest that older adults experienced slightly more noticeable defections
did young adults (especially when interacting with the Selfish Stranger first in the 
Interactive Rounds). Also, consistent with age specific predictions (Hypothesis 6), older 
adults chose to punish the Selfish Stranger for fewer turns after this stranger’s first 
transgression.  
 
3.4.7 Trait Impressions for TFT Stranger Were More Favorable than for Selfish Stranger
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  The trait attributions that participants made for each stranger were aggregate
into an overall composite sum of positive trait attributions for each stranger. These 
overall attributions indicated the participants’ impressions of the individuals with whom 
they believed they were interacting, and they included scores for 18 of the 25 trait 
attributions made immediately after each Interactive Round: likeable, intelligent, k
trustworthy, charitable, friendly, honest, competent, loyal, passive, selfish, stubborn
unfaithful, annoying, uncaring, lazy, inexperienced, and hostile. Responses for negative 
attributes were reverse scored to produce an overall positive-going rating that ranged 
from 18 to 126 (α’s = 0.86-0.92). This aggregate positive attribution score represents 
how the participant viewed each partner after they interacted with them in the game
some degree, participants’ responses reflected the type of experience (i.e., positive or 
negative) that they had during the interaction. Positive interactions were expected to yield 
higher scores, whereas negative interactions during the game were expected to yield 
lower scores.  A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Stranger Type) x 2 (Player Order) mixed model 
ANOVA conducted on these aggregate positive attribution scores revealed that main 









imilarly favorable ratings for the TFT Stranger, t(132) = 0.31, ns, older 
dults offered more favorable attributions about the Selfish Stranger than did young  
2 = .13, and Stranger Type, F(1,128) = 45.68,
η2 = .26, were qualified by a Stranger Type x Age Group interaction, F(1,128) = 15.39, 
η2 = .11. Aggregate positive attribution scores are displayed in Figure 8a by Age Group
and Stranger Type. Although both young and older adults rated the Selfish Strange
favorably than the TFT Stranger, the difference in mean attributions between Stranger 










Interactive Rounds of Experiment 1, displayed separately for each stranger type. (b) 
Interactive Rounds of Experiment 1, displayed separately for each stranger type. 
) 
Figure 8. (a) Aggregate positive attribution scores for young and older adults in the 





adults, t(131) = 6.63. Overall, these findings support the age non-specific prediction tha
all participants would view the TFT Stranger more favorably than the Selfish Stranger
t 
 
(Hypothesis 4). Unexpectedly, older adults were more favorable than young adults in 
their attributions toward the Selfish Stranger.7
 Separate 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Stranger Type) x 2 (Player Order) mixed model 
ANOVAs were also conducted on the cooperative and competitive attributions that 
participants made for each stranger. For cooperative attributions, main effects of Age 
Group, F(1,127) = 14.60, η2 = .10, and Stranger Type, F(1,127) = 59.18, η2 = .32, were 
qualified by an Age Group x Stranger Type interaction, F(1,127) = 7.88, η2 = .06. Young 
and older adults offered equivalent cooperative attributions for the TFT Stranger, t(131) = 
0.38, ns, whereas older adults offered more cooperative attributions for the Selfish 
Stranger than did young adults, t(131) = 5.27. For competitive attributions, there were 
main effects of Age Group, F(1,128) = 4.41, η2 = .03, and Stranger Type, F(1,128) = 
38.01, η2 = .23. On average, older adults rated each stranger as more competitive than did 
young adults, and both age groups rated the Selfish Stranger as more competitive than the 
TFT Stranger. Cooperative and Competitive attribution ratings are displayed in Figure 8b 
by Age Group and Stranger Type. Consistent with the findings from the positive 
aggregate attribution scores, older adults viewed the Selfish Stranger as being more 
cooperative than did young adults. 
 
3.4.8 Young and Older Adults Are Similar in Their Competitive Focus Towards Strangers 
 Just prior to the first Interactive Round, participants were asked to describe the 
strategy that a person would use if they wanted to maximize the number of nickels that 
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they collected while interacting with others. Also, immediately after each Interactive 
nd, participants were asked to describe any goals that they had in mind during the 
interaction. Each participant’s three responses were coded by two raters as falling into 
one of three categories: cooperative, competitive, and neither cooperative nor competitive 
(a.k.a. ambivalent). Inter-rater reliability for this categorization scheme was 96% for the 
responses provided before the Interactive Rounds and 89% for the responses provided 
after the Interactive Rounds.8 Chi-square tests on the participants’ responses prior to the 
Interactive Rounds suggest that young and older adults offered a different pattern of 
responses, χ2(2) = 17.51 (n = 136).Young adults offered the same number of competitive 
(39%) and cooperative (39%) responses, but fewer ambivalent responses (21%). On the 
ore ambivalent responses (55%) than cooperative 
(19%) or competitive (26%) responses. Similar patterns emerged when examining the 
goals that participants reported having in mind while playing the Interactive Rounds (i.e., 
responses collected after each round). When playing with the TFT Stranger, young adults 
reported slightly more competitive responses (47%) than cooperative (23%) or 
ambivalent (31%) responses, whereas older adults reported more ambivalent responses 
(52%) than competitive (34%) or cooperative (13%) responses, χ2(2) = 6.48 (n = 136). 
Finally, when playing with the Selfish Stranger, young adults reported slightly more 
 
 (37%) 
χ2(2) = 6.48 (n = 136). Overall, young and older adults 
ed similar cooperative and competitive tendencies both before and after the 
Interactive Rounds. Young and older adults consistently offered more competitive 
Rou
other hand, older adults offered m
competitive responses (45%) than cooperative (25%) or ambivalent (30%) responses,
whereas older adults reported more ambivalent responses (52%) than competitive




responses than cooperative responses when interacting with strangers. It is worth noting 
that older adults did offer ambivalent responses more frequently than cooperative or 
competitive responses. However, given that the coding scheme was limited to assessin
the competitive or cooperative tone of each res
g 







d more than young adults with the Selfish Stranger 
hen interacting with this stranger first in the Interactive Rounds. Additionally, older 
 
captured by this trend toward ambivalent responding. Contrary to expectations 
(Hypothesis 7), young and older adults were very similar in their competitive focus w
interacting with Strangers. Moreover, the response patterns of older adults did not sugg
that they were any less competitive than young adults when interacting with either 
stranger. 
 
3.4.9 More Nickels Accrued during Interaction with TFT Stranger than with Selfish
Stranger 
 A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Stranger Type) x 2 (Player Order) mixed model ANOVA
conducted on the number of nickels that participants earned in each Interactive Round 
revealed only a main effect of Stranger Type, F(1,128) = 67.27, η2 = .34. Participants 
earned more nickels when interacting with the TFT Stranger (M = 113, SE = 3.5) than 
with the Selfish Stranger (M = 86, SE = 1.5). When examining mean cooperation 
for each of the Interactive Rounds, Player Order interacted with Age Group and Stra
Type because older adults cooperate
w
adults who interacted with the Selfish Stranger after interacting with the TFT Stranger 
did not cooperate as much as those older adults who interacted with the Selfish Stranger
before interacting with the TFT Stranger. Given this, contrasts were conducted (a) to 
50 
  
compare the number of nickels that young and older adults earned when playing the 
Selfish Stranger first in the Interactive Rounds, and (b) to compare the number of nicke
that older adults earned when interacting with the Selfish Stranger in the first versus the
second Interactive Rounds. The first contrast yielded a significant difference in the nickel 
totals of young (M = 83, SE = 2.8) and older (M = 93, SE = 3.1) adults when participants 
interacted with the Selfish Stranger first, t(68) = 2.36. The second contrast yielded a 
significant difference in the nickel totals of older adults who interacted with the Selfish 
Stranger first (M = 93, SE = 3.1) in the Interactive Rounds as opposed to second (M =
SE = 2.7), t(63) = 2.15. The above findings only provide partial support for the age 
specific prediction (Hypothesis 10) that older adults would earn more nickels than young
adults in the Interactive Rounds. The only time when this was true was when older 
adults’ first person-to-person interaction was with the Selfish Stranger. In all other 
conditions, young and older adults accrued similar nickel totals and were thus equally 
effective at managing the interactions with strangers.  
 
3.4.10 Exploration of Gender, Cognitive Abilities, and Individual Difference Measures 
 Theoretical accounts of age-related changes in personality suggest that advancin
age is accompanied by a shift toward androgyny (McCabe, 1989; however, see 
Thompson, 2006). As a result, men become more passive and women may become mo
assertive as they age (Gutmann, 1994). In terms of the iterated PD game, one might 
expect older women to be less likely to cooperate than older men. To examine this 
possibility, a 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Gender) x 2 (Stranger Type) x 2 (Player Order) mi











Interactive Round. The results yielded a main effect of Stranger Type, F(1,127) = 33.65, 
η2 = .21, a Player Order x Gender interaction, F(1,127) = 4.66, η2 = .04, a Stranger T




 emerged because women (M = 0.38, SE = 0.07) cooperated less than men (M 
 0.59, SE = 0.07) with the TFT Stranger after they first played the Selfish Stranger, t(68) 
with the TFT Stranger than older men (M = 0.56, SE = 0.08), t(62) = 1.89, p < 





2 = .06, and a Stranger Type x 
Player Order x Gender interaction, F(1,127) = 4.31, η2 = .03. The first three-way 
interaction emerged because younger women cooperated more with the TFT Str
less with the Selfish Stranger than did older women, t(63) = 2.03 and t(63) = 2.04, 
respectively (Young TFT: M = 0.58, SE = 0.09; Old TFT: M = 0.38, SE = 0.06; Young 
Selfish: M = 0.22, SE = 0.04; Old Selfish: M = 0.34, SE = 0.04). The second three-w
interaction
=
= 2.07. Finally, older women (M = 0.38, SE = 0.06) were marginally less likely to 
cooperate 
.0 hen considered together, these findings suggest that older women were less likely
than older men to cooperate with the TFT Stranger, especially when the TFT Stranger 
followed the Selfish Stranger. Overall, this is consistent with the notion that older wom
can be more assertive than older men. 
 Because there were age differences in each of the cognitive ability measures, 
correlations between these measures and performance during each round of the iterated 
PD game were calculated separately for each age group. For young adults, percentage of
cooperation in the Alone Round (i.e., choosing Doors A or C) was positively related to
the number of correct items on the measure of processing speed, r(69) = .25. For older 
adults, percentage of cooperation in the Alone Round was positively related to inductive 
reasoning ability, r(64) = .31, to verbal ability, r(64) = .30, and to education level, r(6
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.37. Cognitive performance was not significantly related to young or older adults’ 
percentage of cooperation in either of the Interactive Rounds. Given the shape of the 
distributions for mean percentage of cooperation in the Interactive Rounds, each age 
group was divided into tertiles within each Interactive Round so that t-tests could be 
conducted to compare (a) performance on each cognitive ability test and (b) responses in 




ttom: M = 7.0, SE = 0.4), t(51) = 





 When interacting with the TFT Stranger, relative to young adults in the bottom 
cooperation tertile, those young adults in the top tertile had marginally better processing 
speed scores (Top: M = 69.4, SE = 2.7; Bottom: M = 63.9, SE = 1.8) and reported 
marginally less difficulty when it came to disengaging from a goal that was being 
blocked by someone else (Top: M = 1.9, SE = 0.2; Bottom: M = 2.3, SE = 0.2), t(49)
1.74 (p < .09) and t(50) = 1.73 (p < .09), respectively. When interacting with the Se
Stranger, young adults in the bottom cooperation tertile were marginally more extraver
than those in the top tertile (Top: M = 6.0, SE = 0.3; Bo
1
higher emotional suppression scores, t(41) = 2.15  (Top: M = 3.6, SE = 0.2; Bottom: M =
2  = 0.2), reported a marginally more expansive future time perspective, t(41) = 
1.76, p < .09 (Top: M = 44.5, SE = 3.3; Bottom: M = 37.5, SE = 2.3), and were 
marginally more conscientious, t(41) = 1.95, p < .06 (Top: M = 9.3, SE = 0.3; Bottom: M 
= 8.5, SE = 0.3), than older adults in the bottom tertile. When interacting with the Se
Stranger, older adults in the top cooperation tertile had marginally more communal 
values than those in the bottom tertile (Top: M = 4.31, SE = 0.10; Bottom: M = 3.99, SE =
0.13), t(43) = 1.98, p < .06.10
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3.4.11 Summary of Results from Experiment 1 
 In Experiment 1, participants believed that they were interacting with strangers 
via choices that they made in the context of a game. Although young adults outperfor
older adults when they played the game on their own (i.e., the Alone Round), youn
older adults displayed very similar performance when interacting with others. Contrary to 
predictions, older adults did not cooperate more than young adults, on average. 
Moreover, young and older adults were roughly equivalent in their propensity to act out
of their own self-interest during the game. The one exception to this occurred when olde
adults interacted with the Selfish Stranger and they had yet to interact with the Tit-for-Tat
Stranger. When older adults interacted with the Selfish Stranger first in the Interactive 
Rounds, they displayed a propensity towards higher average levels of cooperation. 
course, as the round progressed, older adults became less cooperative. Older adults’ 
initial efforts at trying to maintain cooperation with the Selfish Stranger helped them to 
earn significantly more nickels than young adults. When comparing those older adults a
the high and low ends of the cooperation spectrum during the Interactive Round with the 








ayed higher levels of cooperation held marginally 
 
more communal values than older adults who displayed lower levels of cooperation. 
Overall, however, older adults did not express having more of a cooperative approach to
interacting with the Selfish Stranger than young adults when asked to describe their goal 




EXPERIMENT 2 - INTERACTING WITH FRIENDS 
 
4.1 Overview of Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 2, young and older adults were asked to come to the lab with a 




 is more 
all, if it exists at all.   
of an iterated PD game, first by themselves and then with their friend. As in Experimen
1, participants were not really playing with their human counterparts. Instead, each was 
randomly assigned to play one of two computer-simulated friends. Half of the 
participants from each age group interacted with a simulated friend who reciprocat
participant’s behavior 100% of the time using a Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy (a.k.a., TFT 
friend). The other half from each age group played with a friend who reciprocated the 
participant’s behavior in 75% of the trials, but, during the remaining 25%, this player 
made selfish, or the self-interested, choices (a.k.a., Selfish friend). Previous research has 
demonstrated that individuals are more likely to spontaneously cooperate with another 
player in an iterated PD game if that other player is a friend and not a stranger (Majolo et 
al., 2006). The mutual benefit reflects harmony in the relationship. When one player d
not cooperate, it is implied that, at least temporarily, accumulating more reward
important than the friendship. Once competition flares up in a game between friends, it 
might be easier for the friends to return to cooperative habits if each values the 
relationship more than the desire to “out do” the other player. The personal value 
invested in the relationship should be salient to each friend. When playing strangers, this 
relational value should be sm
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their friends in an iterated PD game. Participants in 
both age groups were expected to demonstrate higher levels of cooperation when playing 
with friends than with strangers, but older adults were thought to be more likely than 
young adults to be more submissive and lenient when friends acted out of self-interest. 
how people react to conflict with close others. Early on in adulthood, individuals compete 
to gain resources. A high value is placed on acquiring information and seeking new 
experiences (Carstensen, 2006). As a result, young adults may be more confrontational 
during conflict as a way to test boundaries and establish rank in a hierarchy. In one’s later 
years, the focus shifts from aggregating resources to maintaining them (Riediger
Freund, 2006; Schindler, Staudinger, & Nesselroade, 2006). Older adults tend to be more
focused than young on maintaining close relationships that offer meaning to their lives 
(Carstensen et al., 1999; McAdams et al., 1993). As a result, when conflict emerges in 
interpersonal relationships, older adults are more acquiescent and choose to devote effo
into maintaining relationship harmony (Blanchard-Fields, 1997; Blanchard-Fields et al
2004; Hoppmann et al., in press). One result of this may be that older adults are less 
driven to punish or retaliate against friends who occasionally betray the mutual interests 
associated with their relationships. It may be easier for older adults to overlook an 
occasional indiscretion or disagreement than it is to find a new group of friends. Support 
for this notion has been found in studies that show that older adults sometimes maintain 
relationships with close others who are the source of negative experiences because the
merely value having close interpersonal associations (Akiyama et al., 2003; Krause & 
Rook, 2003). The purpose of this experiment was to examine how young and older adults
reacted to conflicts that emerged with 
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Moreover, comparisons were made be cipants in each experiment to 
examine if youn nds 
differently. Given that participants have a longer track record of reciprocation with 





ll impression favorability was not 
tween the parti
g and older adults reacted to conflict with strangers and frie
oth young and older adults were e
passive (i.e., cooperative in the face of conflict) when interacting with friends as 
compared with strangers. Older adults were expected to consistently implement strategie
that focused on maximizing positive outcomes, so, as was the case when interacting with 
strangers, older adults were expected to be more cooperative than young adults when 
faced with conflict by friends. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses for Experiment 2 
 Hypotheses for Experiment 2 are broken down into three groups: those where a
should not matter (age non-specific), those where age should matter (age specific), and
those that are more exploratory in nature (exploratory). 
 
4.2.1 Age Non-Specific Hypotheses 
 Again, some trends in the participants’ responses were not expected to vary by 
age. For example, when playing with friends, participants were predicted to display a 
greater percentage of cooperative behavior (i.e., choosing Doors A or C) for the TFT 
Friend than the Selfish Friend because the TFT Friend was more consistently wi
consider the mutual interest of both players (Hypothesis 1). Along similar lines, 
participants were expected to rate the TFT Friend as being more cooperative and less 
competitive than the Selfish Friend. However, overa
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predicted to differ between TFT and Selfish Friends (Hypothesis 2). Also, participants 
were expected to have more favorable impressions of friends than of strangers, especially 
when comparing the impressions of the Selfish Stranger and the Selfish Friend 
(Hypothesis 3). 
 Because friendships are characterized by a track-record of past shared experiences 
that provide mutual benefit, participants were expected to infer that the TFT Friend’
intentions were to cooperate to meet the game’s objective and thus they were predicted to 
display cooperative behavior from the start of the game (Hypothesis 4). This prediction 
stands in stark contrast to that made for play with the TFT Stranger in Experiment 1, 
where cooperative behavior was expected to build over time (Hypothesis 5). Change in 
level of cooperation over time was compared across experiments to see if differences 
existed between participants’ responses to TFT Strangers and their responses to TFT 
Friends. Also, because the strength of one’s friendship might impact the initial level of 
cooperation, a positive correlation was predicted to exist between friendship quality
Experiment 2 only) and the participant’s level of cooperation early in the game 
(Hypothesis 6). 
 
4.2.2 Age Specific Hypotheses 
 As outlined in the overview for Experiment 2, young and older adults differ in the 
strategies that they use when faced with interpersonal conflict. Young adults may be 
more confrontational or reactionary, whereas older adults may be more acquiescent. In 
terms of the iterated PD game, this difference in reactive style was expected to possibl






time, young adults were expected to become less cooperative with a Selfish Friend. 
adults, however, were not expected to display as substantial of a decline in coope
the round with the Selfish Friend progressed (Hypothesis 7). Age differences in chan
cooperative responding over time were examined. As predicted in Experiment 1 as 
older adults were expected to react to conflict that developed with a Selfish Friend
more passivity, whereas young adults were expected to be more confrontational 
(Hypothesis 8). To test this hypothesis, participants’ choices (i.e., act cooperatively or 
selfishly) immediately after the first indiscretion were examined. Young adults were 






ncy of selfish retaliatory behavior than older adults. 
imilarly, young adults were predicted to have more of a competitive focus and less of a 
cooperative focus than olde  Friend (Hypothesis 9). 
 when playing with Selfish 
dividuals, older adults were predicted to be more effective at maintaining higher levels 
 fact, older adults were expected to consistently 
nts 
S
r adults when playing with a Selfish
Analyses were also conducted across experiments to determine if young adults were less 
retaliatory toward Selfish Friends than Selfish Strangers.  
 Because they were expected to be less retaliatory
in
of cooperation than young adults. In
accrue more earnings than young adults in every condition (Hypothesis 10). This 
prediction was tested by comparing young and older adults’ earnings across Experime
1 and 2. 
 
4.2.3 Exploration of Individual Differences 
 As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to complete questionnaires that 
assessed individual differences in personality, competitiveness, locus of control, 
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interpersonal flexibility, interpersonal trust, propensity to use antecedent- and response-
focused emotion regulation, coping flexibility, future time perspective, generativity, 
agentic and communal values, and one’s propensity to engage in life manageme
strategies. Again
nt 
, relationships between scores on these individual difference measures 
d 
 
f the time 
t, or TFT, friend). However, the other friend resembled the TFT stranger 
me of the time, but, as in Experiment 1, displayed self-interested behavior 25% of the 




and overall level of cooperative behavior in the game were examined. Also examined 
were possible relationships between performance in the PD task and the participants’ 
gender and level of cognitive functioning. 
 
4.3 Method for Experiment 2 
4.3.1 Overview 
 As in Experiment 1, young and older adults played an iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) game in Experiment 2. Each participant first played the game alone an
then with a friend who accompanied them to the session. Although individuals were told
that they were playing with their friend, in actuality, each person played with one of two 
computer programs. One program reciprocated the participant’s choices 100% o
(a.k.a. Tit-for-Ta
so
time (a.k.a. Selfish player). Eac
unlike Experiment 1, the type of partner played was a between-subjects factor. Of 
primary interest were the degree to which participants would cooperate with their frie
during the game and the nickels that participants were able to accumulate. Also examine
were the participants’ impressions of their friends’ behavior and their self-reported goals




 Seventy-six young (ages 18-23; M = 19.7, SE = 0.2; 43% women) and 71 older 
adults (ages 56-81; M = 69.0, SE = 0.6; 59% women) were recruited to participate in this 
experiment. Participants were predominantly Caucasian (65%; African American = 9%, 
Asian = 13%, Other = 13%). Young and older adults reported equivalent levels of overall
health and were equally affected by health problems. Older adults (M = 22.4, SE = 0.9) 
obtained a higher vocabulary score than did young adults (M = 15.9, SE = 0.6), t(145) =
6.34, p < .001, but young adults obtained higher scores in inductive reasoning (Letter
Sets; Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976) and processing speed (Digit-Sym
Matching; Salthouse, 1992) than did older adults, t(145) = 9.98 (p < .001) and t(145) = 
14.23 (p < .001), respectively (Young Letter Sets: M = 23.8, SE = 0.3; Old Letter Sets: M
= 17.1, SE = 0.6; Young Speed: M = 68.5, SE = 1.2; Old Speed: M = 46.2, SE = 0.9). On 










years), t(137) = 6.92, p < .001. Finally, young adults (M = 3.44 or “moderately” 
 “very” close, SE = 0.07) reported that they were closer to their friend than did older 
 0.10), t(139) = 3.11, p < .01.11
c ”). Age-related differences also emerged in some of the measures of relations
quality and closeness. Young adults (M = 5.26 or “almost every other day”, SE = 0.14) 
reported more frequent visits with their friend than did older adults (M = 2.74 or “onc
per week”, SE = 0.16), t(139) = 11.93, p < .001. Older adults (M = 13.5 years, SE =1.
years) had been in longer relationships with their friend than young adults (M = 2.4 years, 
SE = 0.3 
to





 4.3.3.1 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Game. The iterated PD game adapted 
for this experiment was exactly the same one used in Experiment 1 (Brown & Rachlin
1999). Once again, the objective of the game was to collect as many nickels as poss
each round. Each round consisted of 32 turns; however, participants were unaware of thi
and were told that each round would end after some randomly-determined number of 
turns. Participants played the first round by themselves (Alone Round) and then played





nd). Participants started off each round with a 
ellow key and were asked to choose between opening Door A or Door B. For the 
Interactive Round, when a pa t the nickels found behind 
e the key that they uncovered to their friend. Their friend would then use 
o 
to 
eable, intelligent, kind, trustworthy, charitable, 
y
rticipant opened a door they kep
the door but gav
this key to open a door during their turn. The optimal strategy for all rounds was t
consistently choose Door A, yielding an average gain of five nickels per turn.  
 As in Experiment 1, participants completed a few questionnaires in conjunction 
with each round of the game. First, after each round, participants were asked to briefly 
describe the goal that they had in mind while playing the game in that round. Second, 
immediately prior to the Interactive Round, participants were asked to describe the 
strategy that they felt would maximize the number of nickels that a person could collect 
in that round. These questions were posed to assess the participants’ approach to and 
frame of mind during the Interactive Round. Responses were coded for the degree 
which they reflected each participant’s competitive or cooperative intentions. Finally, 
after the Interactive Round, participants made trait attributions about their friend by 
indicating the extent to which they agreed that the friend displayed each of 25 personal 
characteristics during the round (i.e., lik
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ity to take 
art in a study examining how people interact with one another while playing a computer 
ts completed a packet of individual difference questionnaires (described 
uncaring, lazy, inexperienced, hostile, independent, cooperative, competitive, impulsive
curious, masculine, and feminine; rating: 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
 Both rounds of the iterated PD game were played on computers using E-prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, USA) that had been programmed to 
create the feel of a turn-based game setting. During the Interactive Round, the 
participants received feedback from the computer programmed friend in such a way to 
make it appear that a real human was taking time to make a response. The computer 
response time randomly varied between 2 to 6 seconds for young adults and 2 to 10 
seconds for older adults. The programs for the TFT Friend and the Selfish Friend were 
identical to that of the TFT Stranger and Selfish Stranger from Experiment 1.  
 4.3.3.2 Individual Difference Measures. Prior to the experimental session, 
participants were asked to complete the same packet of surveys and questionnaires that
were completed in Experiment 1. For a description of each measure, see Appendix A. 
Participants were also asked to complete a questionnaire designed to assess the quality o
their relationship with the friend who accompanied them to the session. This 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix D. 
 
4.3.4 Procedure 
 Pairs of same-gender friends were recruited from the student population at the 





in Appendix A) prior to the laboratory session. During the session in the lab, participants
first completed a short battery of cognitive tests and then were instructed as to the rules 
the Alone Round (see Appendix C) for the instructions that were read to the participants 
before playing the Alone Round). As in Experiment 1, participants were informed (a) that 
they would be collecting nickels by making sequential decisions to open doors using k
(i.e., blue keys open blue doors, and yellow keys open yellow doors), (b) that the decisio
to open a door in one turn impacted the next turn by giving you a new key that limited 
your next choice, and (c) that their objective was to obtain as many nickels as possi
during the round. After completing a short practice round, participants were left alone to 
complete the Alone Round of the game. At the end of the round, participants were asked 
to indicate which strategy a person would use if they wanted to maximize the numbe












 Next, participants were instructed on the game format for the Interactive Round 
(see Appendix C for the instructions that were read to the participants before playing th
Interactive Rounds. Participants were told (a) that they had the same objective as in the
Alone Round, to earn as many nickels as possible, (b) that their choices (as well as t
of their friend) would be limited by the color of the key that they were passed when the 
strangers made their choices, and (c) that they should let the experimenter know 
immediately if there was a connectivity problem between their computer and that of th
friend. No allusions to cooperating (e.g., “partner”) or competing (i.e., “opponent”) we
made in the instructions. If participants asked questions about the intentions of their 
friend, the experimenter responded with an ambiguous, non-evaluative response (e.g., 
“Each person has to use their own judgment when making choices. It is up to each of 
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you.”). Just prior to starting the Interactive Round, participants were once again ask
indicate which strategy a person might use to maximize the number of nickels that they 






subjects factor. Comparisons between 
xperiments 1 and 2 only involve between-subjects factors.12 The main dependent 
) the extent to which participants made cooperative choices (i.e., choose 
After this round, participants were asked to indicate what their objective was while 
playing. They were also asked to provide their impression of their friend by rating the 
friend on 25 personal traits. Once the rounds of the iterated PD game were com
participants were probed for their suspicion about the deception used during the game. 
Afterwards, participants were debriefed as to the purpose of the experiment, and all 
deception involved was disclosed. Participants were also asked to verify that it was 
acceptable to use their data given the deceptive method used to obtain them. 
 
4.4 Results for Experiment 2 
4.4.1 Overview 
 This study used a 2 (Age Group: young and older adults) by 2 (Partner Type: T
for-Tat and Selfish program) by 8 (Time: turns 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, 13-16, 17-20, 21-24, 25-
28, and 29-32) mixed-model design. Age Group and Stranger Type were betw
subjects factors, whereas Time was a within-
E
variables were (a
doors that pass yellow keys; Doors A and C) during the iterated PD game, (b) the trait 
ratings that the participants provided for their friend, (c) the number of nickels that the 
participants earned during the interactive round of the game, and (d) the participants’ 
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self-reported goals for the interactive round of the game. Unless otherwise noted, an α = 
.05 level was used for all of the statistical tests reported below. 
 
4.4.2 Do Young and Older Adults Learn the Main Point of the Game in the Alone Round? 
  Proportion of cooperation (i.e., the percentage of times that Doors A or C were 
chosen) were calculated for each participant for each round as (1) a round total including 
all 32 turns and (2) eight 4-turn blocks. A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Partner Type) x 8 (Time)
mixed model ANOVA conducted on the participants’ percentage of cooperation in the 
Alone Round revealed that main effects of Time, F(7,1001) = 6.41, η
 
  
Figure 9. Percentage of cooperation in the Alone Round of Experiment 2 for each of the 
2 = .04, and Age 
Group F(1,143) = 37.42, η2 = .21, were qualified by a significant Time x Age Group 
interaction F(7,1001) = 7.16, η2 = .05. As depicted in Figure 9, the interaction was driven
 
eight 4-turn blocks, displayed separately for young and older adults. 
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by older adults’ significant improvement in the game over time. For example, the contrast
between older adults’ first and last 4-turn blocks revealed a significant difference in 






, both age 
roups experienced decline in performance when shifting from the Alone Round to the 
Interactive Rounds.14 A 2 (Ag d Interactive) x 2 (Partner 




young and older adults displayed less cooperation in the Interactive Round than in the 
diff = 0.11, SE = 0.03) . Young adults remained stable in thei
performance and outperformed older adults at every time point during the Alone Ro
Moreover, results were consistent across Experiments 1 and 2.13 Similar learning trend
in each experiment made it possible to compare results across experiments. 
 
4.4.3 Average Cooperation Declines between the Alone Round and Interactive Roun
Both Age Groups 
 Although young adults outperformed older adults in the Alone Round
g
e Group) x 2 (Round: Alone an
Type) mixed mo
across all 32 turns in each round. For this analysis, Round was a within-subjects factor 
representing participants’ performance in the Alone Round and the Interactive Round. 
Differences in how participants treated each type of Friend were captured by the 
between-subjects Partner Type factor. This analysis yielded main effects of Round, 
F(1,140) = 66.67, η2 = .32, Age Group, F(1,140) = 8.43, η2 = .06, and Partner Type
F(1,140) = 8.54, η2 = .06. These main effects were qualified by a Round x Age Group 
interaction, F(1,140) = 16.02, η2 = .10, and a Round x Partner Type interaction, F(1,14
= 34.70, η2 = .20. For each Age Group, mean cooperation levels for the Alone and 
Interactive Rounds are displayed separately by Partner Type in Figure 10. Overall, bot
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Alone Round: Alone (M = 0.78, SE = 0.04) versus Interactive (M = 0.52, SE = 0.03). The 
Round x Age Group Interaction was driven by the young adults’ superior performance 





0.05). Consistent with age non-specific predictions (Hypothesis 1), participants 
cooperated more with the TFT Friend than the Selfish Friend.15  
 
4.4.4 Cooperation Remains Stable with the TFT Friend but Declines with the Selfish 
Friend 
 A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Partner Type) between-subjects ANOVA conducted on 
mean cooperation in the Interactive Round yielded only a main effect of Partner Type, 
F(1,140) = 26.72, η2 = .16. Young and older adults who interacted with the TFT Friend 
(Young: M = 0.69, SE = 0.06; Old: M = 0.66, SE = 0.06) displayed higher levels of 
cooperation in the Interactive Round than those young and older adults who interacted 
SE = 0.06).   
(M
0.04), t(145) = 6.02. Young and older adults did not differ in their overall performance in 
the Interactive Round (Young: M = 0.52, SE = 0.05; Old: M = 0.53, SE = 0.04), t(141) =
0.12, ns. The Round x Partner interaction stems from the tendency for those participants 
who interacted with the Selfish Friend (M = 0.37, SE = 0.04) to cooperate less than those
who interacted with the TFT Friend (M = 0.67, SE = 0.04). This difference led to a large
drop in cooperation between the Alone Round and the Interactive Round for those 
participants who interacted with the Selfish Friend program, t(69) = 9.15 (Mdiff = 0.45,
= 0.05) as opposed to the TFT Friend program, t(73) = 1.67, p < .10 (Mdiff = 0.08, SE = 




Figure 10. Average total percentage of cooperation for each round of Experiment 2,





 In addition to examining participants’ overall performance in the interactive 
rounds, separate 2 (Age Group) x 8 (Time) mixed model ANOVAs were conducted for 
each Partner Type to describe any changes in cooperation that took place over time in the 
Interactive Round. No significant effects emerged when participants interacted with the 
TFT Friend. For the interaction with the Selfish Friend, the mixed model ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of Time, F(7,476) = 13.25, η2 = .16. Within-subjects contrasts 
comparing mean performance between each 4-turn block showed that cooperation 
dropped between the block 1 and block 2, F(1,68) = 13.32, η2 = .16, and again between 
block 2 and block 3, F(1,68) = 9.39, η2 = .12. Mean levels of cooperation at each ti




Figure 11. Percentage of cooperation in the Interactive Round of Experiment 2 for each 
of the eight 4-turn blocks, displayed separately by friend type. 
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Consistent with age non-specific predictions (Hypothesis 1), all participants cooperated 
more with the TFT Friend than the Selfish Friend. However, contrary to age specific 
predictions (Hypothesis 7), young and older adults displayed the same decline in 
cooperation over time when interacting with the Selfish Friend. Older adults were 
expected to be more cooperative with the Selfish Friend than were young adults. 
Additionally, young and older adults displayed equivalent levels of cooperation when 
interacting with the TFT Friend.16  
 
4.4.5 Examination of Distributions Revealed More Cooperation with TFT Friend than 
with Selfish Friend 
 Up to this point, the above findings suggest that young and older adults were 
equally likely to start a conflict with a friend and were also equally likely to use 
retaliatory behavior (i.e., Choose Door D or fail to cooperate) in response to a conflict 
created by a friend. However, it is difficult to get a clear sense for such specific types of 
behaviors merely by examining the participants’ mean performance within the Interactive 
Round. To remedy this, the distributions of the participants’ average responses were 
characterized for each type of friend program (as was done for Experiment 1) and then 
possible Age Group differences in specific turn-by-turn behaviors were explored. 
  Figure 12 displays the histograms for young and older adults’ overall cooperation 
with each Partner Type during the Interactive Round. When interacting with the TFT 
Friend, 58% of young adults and 44% of older adults chose to cooperate or to defect 
ish Friend, this tendency to stick with 
the same response for every turn was not as substantial (Young = 20%; Old = 23%). In  






Figure 12. Histograms of average total percentage of cooperation frequency counts for 







both conditions, young and older adults’ mean levels of cooperation were not normally 
distributed. To further examine possible differences in young and older adults’ behavi
when they interacted with their friend (e.g., are young adults more likely than olde
to choose to pass a blue key for every turn), mean cooperation for each individual w
categorized as 100% Cooperation, 100% Defection, or “Somewhere in between”. 
square test was conducted for each age group to determine if membership in each of th






iend program with which the participant interacted. 
or young adults, significantly more individuals chose to cooperate 100% of the time 








when interacting with the TFT Friend (100% Cooperation = 45%, “Somewhere in 
between” = 42%, an
Cooperation = 0%, “Somewhere in between” = 80%, and 100% Defection = 20%), χ2
= 20.52, n = 73, p < .001. Likewise, significantly more older adults chose to coop
100% of the time when interacting with the TFT Friend (100% Cooperation = 39%, 
“Somewhere in between” = 56%, and 100% Defection = 6%) than the Selfish Friend 
(100% Cooperation = 9%, “Somewhere in between” = 77%, and 100% Defection = 
14%), χ2(2) = 9.43, n = 71, p < .01. Although both young and older adults displayed 
consistent cooperative behavior more often when interacting with the TFT Friend than 
the Selfish friend, the question remains: were young and older adults similar in the
propensities to consistently cooperate? A chi-square test was conducted for each Friend 
program to determine if membership in the cooperation categories differed by age grou
For the TFT Friend, young and older adults were equally likely to stick with consisten
cooperation, χ2(2) = 1.97, n = 74, p > .37 (Young: 100% Cooperation = 45%, 
“Somewhere in between” = 42%, and 100% Defection = 13%; Old: 100% Cooperation =
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39%, “Somewhere in between” = 56%, and 100% Defection = 6%). For the Selfish 
riend, young and older adults were equally unlikely to stick with consistent cooperation 
and equally likely to stick with consistent defection, χ2(2) = 3.35, n = 70, p > .19 (Young: 
100% Cooperation = 0%, “Somewhere in between” = 80%, and 100% Defection = 20%; 
Old: 100% Cooperation = 9%, “Somewhere in between” = 77%, and 100% Defection = 
14%). Consistent with age non-specific predictions (Hypothesis 1), young and older 
adults were both more likely to stick with consistent cooperation when interacting with 
the TFT Friend than when interacting with the Selfish Friend.  
 
4.4.6 Examination of Turn-by-Turn Behavior during Interactive PD Rounds Confirms 
Lack of Age-Related Differences 
 In addition to looking at age-related differences in the distributions of 
participants, an examination of turn-by-turn decisions could be useful for identifying 
possible differences in the ways that young and older adults interacted with their friends 
or for detecting additional evidence to verify the lack of age-related differences seen thus 
far. For example, consistent with the finding that young and older adults displayed 
equivalent levels of cooperation with the TFT Friend, t(72) = 0.28, ns, young and older 
adults were equally likely to choose to choose Door B (i.e., pass a blue key) in order to 
acquire more nickels (i.e., win the round) when interacting with TFT Friend, χ2(1) = 0.17, 
h 
periment 1, each participant’s responses when interacting with the Selfish 
Friend were examined to determine (a) the overall number of times that the Selfish 
Stranger chose to pass a blue key after the participant had passed this stranger a yellow 
F




key (a.k.a., noticeable defections), (b) the number of consecutive times that the 
participant passed the Selfish Stranger a blue key after this stranger’s first noticeable 
defection (a.k.a., punishing), and (c) the likelihood that that the participant would decide 
to choose B after forgiving the Selfish Stranger’s first noticeable defection (a.k.a. gettin
even). Young (M = 2.7, SE = 0.4) and older (M = 3.1, SE = 0.4) adults experienced an 
equivalent number of noticeable defections when interacting with the Selfish Friend, 
t(68) = 0.61, ns. Moreover, after the Selfish Friend’s first noticeable defection, young (M
= 5.7, SE = 1.7) and older adults (M = 7.1, SE = 1.8) passed the same number of 
consecutive blue keys to their friend, t(68) = 0.61, ns. Finally, an equal proportion o
young and older adults chose to get even with the Selfish Friend by choosing Door











2(1) = 0.39, n = 31, p > .41 (Young = 23%; 
Old = 33%). Overall, analyses of the participants’ turn-by-turn behaviors support the 
findings reported earlier and age non-specific predictions (Hypothesis 1); both young
older adults were more cooperative with the TFT Friend than with the Selfish friend, a
there were no distinct differences between the choices made by young and older adul
This was inconsistent with the age-specific prediction that young adults would be mo
confrontational and older adults would be more acquiescent after being taken advantage
of by a friend (Hypothesis 8).  
 
4.4.7 Trait Impressions for the TFT Friend Were More Favorable than for the Selfish 
Friend 
 For each Partner Type, the trait attributions that participants made after
completing the Interactive Round were aggregated into an overall composite sum of 
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positive trait attributions. As in Experiment 1, the aggregate included scores from 18
possible traits, which displayed a high level of internal consistency (TFT Friend: α = 
0.90; Selfish Friend: α = 0.92). This aggregate positive attribution score represents how 
the participant viewed their partner after they interacted with them in the game. To some 
degree, participants’ responses reflected the type of experience (i.e., positive or negative)
that they had during this interaction. A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Partner Type) between-
subjects ANOVA on the aggregate positive attribution scores revealed main effects of 
Age Group, F(1,142) = 15.93, η
 
 
42) = 41.31, η2 = .26. On 
verage, older adults rated their partners more favorably than did young adults, and the 
g 
: M = 107.1, SE = 2.9; Young Selfish: M = 77.2, SE = 
 initial age 
e 
2 = .10, and Partner Type, F(1,1
a
TFT Friend was rated more favorably by participants than was the Selfish Friend (Youn
TFT: M = 99.1, SE = 2.8; Old TFT
2.8, Old Selfish: M = 92.1, SE = 2.9). Overall, these findings fail to support the
non-specific prediction that participants’ impressions of the TFT and Selfish Friend 
would not differ from one another (Hypothesis 2). Despite having a track record of past 
interactions, participants viewed their friends less favorably when they created an 
obstacle to their success in the game. 
 In addition to examining the aggregate positive attribution scores, separate 2 (Ag
Group) x 2 (Partner Type) between-subjects ANOVAs were also conducted on the 
competitive and cooperative attributions that participants made after the Interactive 
Round. For cooperative attributions, there was a main effect of Partner Type, F(1,142) = 
40.76, η2 = .22, and a marginal main effect of Age Group, F(1,142) = 3.57, p < .07, η2 = 
.03. Consistent with predictions (Hypothesis 2), the TFT Friend was rated as more 
cooperative than the Selfish Friend. The marginal main effect of Partner Type emerged 
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because older adults gave the Selfish Friend higher cooperative ratings than did 
adults, t(71) = 2.07 (Young TFT: M = 5.9, SE = 0.3; Old TFT: M = 6.1, SE = 0.3; You
Selfish: M = 3.7, SE = 0.3, Old Selfish: M = 4.7, SE = 0.3). For competitive attributions, 









r to the Interactive Round. Also, immediately after the 
teractive Round, participants were asked to describe any goals that they had in mind 
: cooperative, competitive, or neither cooperative nor competitive (a.k.a. 
e 
 
2 = .22, was qualified by an Age 
Group x Player Type interaction, F(1,142) = 11.40, η2 = .08. Although young and older
adults provided similar competitive ratings for the Selfish Friend (Young Selfish: M =
6.0, SE = 0.2, Old Selfish: M = 5.9, SE = 0.2), young adults provided lower 
competitiveness ratings than older adults for the TFT Friend (Young TFT: M = 4.
0.2, Old TFT: M = 6.3, SE = 0.2). Overall, young adults were able to distinguish betwe
the cooperative and competitive tendencies of the two types of friends, but older adults
were only able to distinguish the two types of friends based on their differing levels of 
cooperativeness. 
 
4.4.8 Young and Older Adults Were Similar in the Extent to which They Held a 
Competitive or a Cooperative Focus when Interacting with Friends 
 As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to describe the strategy that a person
would use if they wanted to maximize the number of nickels that they collected while 
interacting with others just prio
In
during the interaction. Two raters coded each response as falling into one of three 
categories
ambivalent). Inter-rater reliability for this categorization scheme was 89% for th
responses provided before the Interactive Round and 90% for the responses provided
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after the Interactive Round. As with Experiment 1, the coding scheme was limited to 
characterizing the cooperative and competitive tone, so responses coded as ambivalen
varied in content (e.g., from non-codeable to instrumentally-oriented responses). 
Moreover, comparisons were not made between different question types given temporal 
differences in content (e.g., “wait-and-see” or contingent strategies offered before versus 
reactive goals offered afterwards). Chi-square tests conducted on the participants’ 
responses prior to the Interactive Round demonstrated that young and older adults offer










2(2) = 4.55, p > .10 (n = 147).Young adults offered 
slightly more cooperative responses (47%) than competitive (30%) or ambivalent (22%)
responses, and older adults responses were more cooperative (41%) and ambivalent 
(38%) than competitive (21%). Similar patterns emerged when examining the goals that 
participants reported having in mind during the Interactive Round (i.e., responses 
collected after each round). Overall, young adults reported having similar goals while
interacting with the TFT and Selfish Friends (TFT Friend: Cooperative = 45%, 
Competitive = 21%, and Ambivalent = 34%; Selfish Friend: Cooperative = 32%, 
Competitive = 37%, and Ambivalent =
also reported having similar goals while interacting with the TFT and Selfish Friends 
(TFT Friend: Cooperative = 25%, Competitive = 25%, and Ambivalent = 50%; Self
Friend: Cooperative = 37%, Competitive = 25%, and Ambivalent = 37%), χ2(2) = 1.
> .46 (n = 71). Chi-square tests conducted on the participants’ responses separately by 
Partner Type also failed to yield any significant differences in the patterns of responses 
offered by young and older adults, χTFT2(2) = 3.28, p > .19 (n = 74) and χSelfish2(2) =
p > .59 (n = 73). Contrary to age specific predictions (Hypothesis 9), young adults did no
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report having more of a competitive focus than older adults while interacting with the 
Selfish friend. Overall, the distributions of individuals who held a cooperative or a 
competitive focus during the round were not different between age groups.  
 
4.4.9 More Nickels Accrued during Interaction with TFT Friend than with Selfish Friend
 A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Partner Type) between-subjects ANOVA conducted on th
number of nickels that the participants earned in the Interactive Round revea
main effect of Partner Type, F(1,140) = 64.41, 
 
e 
led only a 
η2 = .32. Young and older adults both 
earned more nickels when interacting with the TFT Friend (Young: M = 131, SE = 4.7; 
Old: M = 129, SE = 4.9) than when interacting with the Selfish Friend (Young: M = 89, 
SE = 4.9; Old: M = 92, SE = 4.9). Contrary to age specific predictions (Hypothesis 10), 
older adults did not outperform young adults by earning more nickels when interacting 





4.4.10 Exploration of Gender, Cognitive Abilities, and Individual Dif
 As mentioned in the Results section of Experiment 1, theoretical accounts of age-
related changes in personality suggest that advancing age is accompanied by a shift 
toward androgyny such that men become more passive and women become more 
assertive (Gutmann, 1994). A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Gender) x 2 (Partner Type) between-
subjects ANOVA was performed separately for the participants’ average level of 
cooperation in the Interactive Round and their aggregate positive attributions to 
investigate this possibility. With respect to mean level of cooperation in the Interac
Round, gender had no significant effects. However, for the aggregate positive 
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attributions, there was a main effect for Gender, F(1,138) = 8.36, η2 = .06, and also a 
marginal Age Group x Gender interaction, F(1,138) = 3.46, η2 = .02. The marginal 
interaction emerged because young men (M = 82.3, SE = 2.6) offered less favorab
attributions than young women (M = 95.6, SE = 2.9), older men (M = 97.9, SE = 3.1), and
older women (M = 100.8; SE = 2.6). The above findings do not support the prediction 
that advancing age is associated with more assertive behavior on the part of women and 
more passive behavior on the part of men. Because there were age differences in each of 
the cognitive ability measures, correlations between these measures and performanc
during each round of the iterated PD game were calculated separately for each age group.
For the Alone Round, percentage of cooperation was not significantly related to any 
the cognitive measures for either age group. For the Interactive Round, mean level 
cooperation was positively related to inductive reasoning, r(38) = .38, processing s
r(38) = .33, and verbal ability, r(38) = .41, for those young adults who interacted with 
Selfish Friend. Given the shape of the distributions for mean percentage of coop
the Interactive Rounds, each age group was divided into tertiles within each Intera
Round so that t-tests could be conducted to compare (a) performance on each cognitive 
ability test and (b) responses in each social individual difference measure for members












 When interacting with the TFT Friend, relative to young adults in the bottom 
tertile of mean cooperation, those young adults in the top tertile had higher scores on 
measures of inductive reasoning, t(28) = 2.22 (Top: M = 25.4, SE = 0.6; Bottom: M = 
23.1, SE = 0.8), processing speed, t(28) = 2.33 (Top: M = 74.7, SE = 2.9; Bottom: M = 
64.5, SE = 3.3), and verbal ability, t(28) = 2.63 (Top: M = 17.5, SE = 1.4; Bottom: M = 
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12.4, SE = 1.3). They also had higher generativity scores, t(28) = 2.21 (Top: M = 61.9, 
= 2.1; Bottom: M = 53.9, SE = 3.1), and marginally higher emotion suppression sco








daily activities, t(22) = 2.84 (Top: M = 1.1, SE = 0.1; Bottom: M = 1.7, 
E = 0.2), and were more likely to endorse the use of self-protective intraindividual 
ertile 
) = 




comparisons when a problem developed in their relationships, t(28) = 2.57 (Top: M = 1.7, 
S .2; Bottom: M = 2.7, SE = 0.3). When interacting with the Selfish Friend, young 
adults in the top tertile of cooperation had higher emotional reappraisal, t(22) = 2.79 
(Top: M = 5.6, SE = 0.2; Bottom: M = 4.7, SE = 0.2) and generativity scores, t(22) = 2
(Top: M = 60.2, SE = 2.9; Bottom: M = 52.3, SE = 2.2) than those in the bottom tertile. 
Young adults in the top tertile were also less neurotic, t(22) = 2.88 (Top: M = 3.9, SE = 
0.3; Bottom: M = 5.4, SE = 0.4), reported better overall health, t(22) = 2.29 (Top: M = 
4.4, SE = 0.2; Bottom: M = 3.8, SE = 0.2) and that health problems were less likely to ge
in the way of their 
S
comparison when an obstacle emerged in a relationship, t(22) = 2.73 (Top: M = 2.7, SE = 
0.2; Bottom: M = 1.8, SE = 0.2). 
 When interacting with the TFT Friend, relative to older adults in the bottom t
of mean cooperation, those older adults in the top tertile were more agreeable, t(24
2.15 (Top: M = 8.3, SE = 0.4; Bottom: M = 6.8, SE = 0.6), had marginally more 
interpersonal trust, t(24) = 1.77, p < .10  (Top: M = 3.4, SE = 0.2; Bottom: M = 3.0
0.2), and reported being marginally less capable of expressing emotions (both po
and negative) in difficult interpersonal situations, t(24) = 1.76, p < .10  (Top: M = 75.3, 
SE = 3.4; Bottom: M = 82.8, SE = 2.3). Those older adults in the top tertile also
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marginally more likely to endorse the use of compensatory primary control, t(24) = 1.6
p < .12 (Top: M = 3.0, SE = 0.2; Bottom: M = 2.5, SE = 0.2) and self-protective 
intraindividual comparison when an obstacle emerged in a relationship, t(24) = 1.84, 
.08  (Top: M = 3.3, SE = 0.1; Bottom: M = 2.8, SE = 0.3). When interacting with the 
Selfish Friend, older adults in the top tertile of mean cooperation were marginally less 
likely to disengage from a goal when a relationship obstacle stood in the way of obtaining










4.4.11 Summary of Results from Experiment 2 
 As in Experiment 1, young adults outperformed older adults during the Alone 
Round, cooperating more and thus earning more nickels. However, during the Intera
Round, young and older adults did not differ in their overall levels of cooperation. Both 
young and older adults were more cooperative when interacting with the TFT Friend than 
when interacting with the Selfish Friend. Additionally, all participants formed more 
favorable impressions of the TFT Friend than of the Selfish Friend. Overall, however, 
older adults were more positive than young adults in the attributions that they made 
toward their friends. Neither age group reported having more of a competitive or 
cooperative focus than the oth
behavioral tendencies when interacting with each partner. The average level of 
cooperation generally remained stable over time when participants interacted with the
TFT Friend. When interacting with the Selfish Friend, cooperation decreased over time




4.5 Comparing Results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
4.5.1 Overview 
 Across experiments, each sample of participants interacted with exactly the same 
two computer programs (i.e., the Tit-for-Tat program and the Selfish program). T
aspect of the methodology that changed between the experiments was the identity of the 
person with whom the participants were interacting. Given this, analyses were conducte
to determine if young and older adults each displayed similar levels of cooperative 
behavior when interacting with strangers and friends. 
 
4.5.2 Participants Cooperated More with Friends than with Strangers and More with 
TFT Partners than with Selfish Partners 
 A 2(Age Group) x 2 (Partner Relation: Stranger and Friend) x 2 (Partner Type: 
TFT and Selfish) x 8 (Time: consecutive 4-turn blocks) mixed model ANOVA conducted 
on participants’ mean level of cooperation over each of eight consecutive 4-turn bloc









2 = .03, Partner Type, 
F(1,272) = 32.42, η2 = .11, and T
qualified by a significant Time x Partner Type interaction, F(7,1904) = 22.12, η2 = .08, 
and a marginal Age Group x Partner Type interaction, F(1,272) = 2.97, η2 = .01.19  Me
levels of cooperation at each time point for each Partner Type and Partner Relatio
displayed separately for each age group in Figure 13. The Time x Partner Type 
interaction emerged because young and older adults both displayed decreasing levels of
cooperation for the Selfish partner relative to the TFT partner. Although young and olde





Figure 13. Percentage of cooperation in the Interactive Round for each of the eight 4-turn 
r adults by partner type (Experiment 1 = 
trangers; Experiment 2 = Friends). 




differential de  TFT versus 
e. The Age Group x Partner Type interaction emerged because, across 
er 
econd round of the Interactive 
ounds (i.e., after interacting with the TFT Stranger) and (b) all young adults regardless 





cline in their levels of cooperation with each Partner Type (i.e.,
Selfish) over tim
Partner Relation (i.e., in both experiments), older adults (M = 0.40, SE = 0.04) were more 
cooperative than young adults (M = 0.28, SE = 0.04) with Selfish partners. However, it is 
important to note that this interaction accounts for only those older adults from 
Experiment 1 who interacted with the Selfish Stranger in the first of the two Interactive 
Rounds. These older adults displayed higher levels of cooperation than (a) those old
adults who interacted with the Selfish Stranger in the s
R
of when they interacted with the Selfish Stranger. In Experiment 2, young and older 
adults displayed equivalent trajectories of
these findings suggest that young and older adults were both more likely to cooperate 
with friends than with strangers. Also, older adults displayed a marginally higher 
propensity for cooperating with Selfish partners than did young adults, but this effect wa
driven by older adults more cooperative behavior when interacting with the Selfish
Stranger early in the Interactive Round of Experiment 1. Also, the above findings are 
inconsistent with age specific predictions that older adults would not show as substantial
of a decline in cooperation when interacting with friends as opposed to strangers 
(Hypothesis 7). Regardless of Partner Relation, young and old adults showed similar 
mean level changes throughout the game.
 
4.5.3 Trait Impressions for Friends Were More Favorable than for Strangers 
85 
  
 A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Partner Relation: Stranger and Friend) x 2 (Partner Type: 
TFT and Selfish) between-subjects ANOVA conducted on the aggregate positive 
attributions yielded significant main effects of Age Group, F(1,270) = 24.84, η2 = .08, 
Partner Relation, F(1,270) = 60.31, η2 = .18, and Partner Type, F(1,270) = 63.03, η2 = 
.19. These main effects were qualified by significant Age Group x Partner Relation, 
F(1,270) = 7.73, η2 = .03, and Partner Relation x Partner Type, F(1,270) = 4.86, η2 = .02, 
interactions. The Age Group x Partner Relation interaction emerged because older adults’ 
attributions were proportionally more positive than young adults when describing friends 
relative to strangers (Young Stranger: M = 76, SE = 1.8; Young Friend: M = 88, SE = 1.7; 
Old Stranger: M = 83, SE = 1.9; Old Friend: M = 99, SE = 1.8). Contrary to age non-
specific expectations, participants made more favorable attributions about friends when 
interacting with the TFT program than when interacting with the Selfish program 
(Hypothesis 2); no differences were expected. However, consistent with age non-specific 
predictions, young and older adults’ offered more favorable attributions for friends than 
for strangers (Hypothesis 3). Finally, older adults provided more favorable attributions 
than did young adults, and, in particular, they provided proportionally more favorable 
ratings for their friends than did young adults.  
 
4.5.4 Young and Older Adults Hold a More Cooperative Focus when Interacting with 
Friends than with Strangers 
 Before the Interactive Round, participants indicated which strategy they thought 
ants’ responses were coded as reflecting 
would maximize the number of nickels they could earn when playing with another 
person. As mentioned earlier, particip
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competitive intentions, cooperative intentions, or neither cooperative nor competitive 
intentions (a.k.a. ambivalent). Chi-square tests were conducted to compare the 
participants’ distribution of responses to this question between experiments (Strangers 
versus Friends) separately by age group. Young adults’ distributions of responses were 
not different across experiments, χ2(2) = 1.45, n = 147, p > .48 (Stranger: Comp
39%, Cooperative = 39%, and Ambivalent = 21%; Friend: Competitive = 30%, 
Cooperative = 47%, and Ambivalent = 22%). Older adults, on the other hand, were mo









r tive = 38%, and Ambivalent = 33%; Old 
tranger: Competitive = 35%, Cooperative = 12%, and Ambivalent = 52%; Old Friend: 
ts are 
2(2)
8.21, n = 136, p < .05 (Stranger: Competitive = 26%, Cooperative = 19%, and 
Ambivalent = 55%; Friend: Competitive = 21%, Cooperative = 41%, and Ambivalen
38%).21
 After the Interactive Round, participants described the goal that they had in mind 
while playing. These responses were also coded as either reflecting competitive or
cooperative intentions or as being ambivalent. Chi-square tests were conducted to 
compare the participants’ distribution of responses to this question between experim
(Strangers versus Friends) separately by age group. Young adults and older adults wer
both more cooperative in their responses when interacting with friends than with 
strangers, χ2(2) = 8.20, n = 147, p < .05 and χ2(2) = 7.03, n = 136, p < .05, respec
(Young Stranger: Competitive = 52%, Cooperative = 25%, and Ambivalent = 23%; 
Young Friend: Competitive = 29%, Coope a
S
Competitive = 25%, Cooperative = 31%, and Ambivalent = 44%). These resul
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convergent with those found for cooperative behavior during the game. Participants wer
more cooperative when interacting with friends than with strangers.  
 
4.5.5 More Nickels Accrued when Interacting with Friends than with Strangers and whe
Interacting with TFT Partners than Selfish Partners 
 A 2(Age Group) x 2 (Partner Relation: Stranger and Friend) x 2 (Partner Type: 
TFT and Selfish) between-subjects ANOVA conducted on the total number of nickels 






8; Friends: M = 130, SE = 4.1). Overall, 
ese findings are inconsistent with the age specific prediction that older adults would 
ber of nickels earned when individuals interacted with any 
2 = .03, Partner Type, F(1,272) = 83.07, η2 = .23, which were qualified by a marginal 
Partner Relation x Partner Type interaction, F(1,272) = 3.63, η2 = .01, p < .06. 
Participants earned more nickels (a) when interacting with friends than when with 
strangers, and (b) when interacting with the TFT partner than with the Selfish partner. 
However, the difference in the number of nickels that individuals earned when playing 
with Selfish Friends and Strangers, t(138) = 1.10, ns, Mdiff = 3.6, SEdiff = 3.2 (Strangers: 
M = 87, SE = 2.2; Friends: M = 90, SE = 2.4), was smaller than the difference in nickels
that individuals earned when playing with TFT Friends and Strangers, t(138) = 2.66, M
= 16.7, SEdiff = 6.3 (Strangers: M = 113, SE = 4.
th
earn more nickels than young adults in the Interactive Round, as there were no age-
related differences in the num




4.5.6 Summary of Comparisons of Results between Experiments 1 and 2 
 Overall, comparisons between the two experiments demonstrated that yo
older adults both (a) were more likely to cooperate with friends than with strangers, and
(b) were more likely to cooperate with the Tit-for-Tat partner than with the Selfish 
partner. Over time, both young and older adults displayed decreasing levels of 
cooperation as the Selfish partner took advantage of them in the game. However
young and older adults were slightly more tolerant of friends than of strangers. Contrary 
to expectations, participants rated their friends less favorably when they interacted with 
the Selfish partner than the TFT partner. Consistent with predictions, though, y






ults provided more favorable attributions of all of their partners than did young 
lder 
or-Tat 
adults. Participants were also more likely to report a cooperative focus when interacting 
with friends than when interacting with strangers. Across experiments, young and o
adults did not differ in the nickels that they were able to accumulate during the 
Interactive Round. Given that participants cooperated more with friends than with 
strangers, earnings were higher in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1. However, within 
each experiment, participants earned more nickels when interacting with the Tit-f












merge. Unexpectedly, young adults were more likely than older adults to 
igure out and implement the game’s ideal strategy during the Alone Round of play. 
However, young adults displayed a sharper decline in performance than did older adults 
 These two experiments used an objective measure of interpersonal problem 
solving to examine how effective young and older ad
e d when interacting with others. Overall, young and older adults demonstrated 
similar patterns of behavior when interacting with friends and strangers. Members of bo
age groups displayed higher levels of cooperation and earned more nickels when 
interacting with friends than with strangers. Likewise, they displayed higher levels of 
cooperation and earned more nickels when playing with Tit-for-Tat partners tha
Selfish partners. When conflict emerged during the interaction, young and older ad
both reduced their average level of cooperation as the number of their partner’s 
indiscretions increased. But in the Tit-for-Tat rounds, participants generally developed a
single pattern of choices and maintained this pattern throughout the round. Although 
these two experiments sought to provide evidence that advancing age is characterized by 
the development of a social expertise that allows older adults to more flexibly and 
effectively implement strategies when faced with interpersonal conflict than young 
adults, for the most part, young and older adults displayed very similar patterns of 
cooperative behavior when interacting with friends and strangers.  













g an interaction with a Selfish Stranger, young and 
older adults were equally effective at managing their simulated interactions. 
 
5.1 Problem Solving Strategies Used in the Game 
 One of the objectives of these two experiments was to characterize the strategies 
that young and older adults implemented during the game. When playing the game, 
reluctance to implement a strategy of consistent cooperation when interacting with others
Given that both age groups displayed a decline in performance between the Alone and 
Interactive Rounds, the mere thought of playing with another person (be it a friend o
stranger) elicited competitive behavior very early in the Interactive Rounds. Alt
young and older adults were similar in the competitiveness that they displayed toward 
their partners, older adults were more likely to cooperate with Selfish Strangers and held 
more favorable impressions of them as well. In fact, overall, older adults had more 
favorable impressions of all of their gaming partners than did young adults, suggesting 
that competitive behavior displayed in the game had less of a detrimental impact on olde
adults’ subjective experience of the interaction than it did on that of young adults. 
Although not found in all conditions of the two experiments, the differences that did 
emerge between young and older adults partially support the hypothesis that advancing 
age is associated with the use of more passive interpersonal problem solving stra
(Blanchard-Fields et al., 2004) that may be aimed at managing conflict and attenuat
the negative emotions experienced when one’s goals are blocked in an interaction (Bir
& Fingermann, 2005; Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Hoppmann et al., in press). Again, aside 
from this single condition involvin
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participants were limited to two possi ction in each turn: (Choice 1) self-
sacrificial cooperation or (Choice 2 ction. That is, in each turn, 








 beginning of the 
ame. T rack 
t 
ble courses of a
) self-interested defe
nickel less than the maximum that they could earn on their turn and would put their 
partner in a position to attain the maximum, or (2) they would choose a door that gave 
them the maximum possible nickels but would prevent their partner from being able to
earn an equivalent amount. In the long run, consistently choosing self-sacrificial 
cooperation allowed each person to maximize the number of nickels that they earn
whereas choosing self-interested defection allowed one to take the lead over his or her
partner (and possibly to “win” the game). These choices were embedded in the context 
a sequence of turns. Participants interacted with partners over a set period of time, 
allowing for a mental track record of game-related events to build up in the parti
mind. Although these events were not recorded from the participant’s perspective in such
a way as to create a narrative that could be analyzed for the motives underlying the 
participants’ choices, meanings could be inferred from a participant’s choices by also 
examining their partners’ choices.  
 Overall, six patterns (A-F) of decisions emerged from both young and older 
adults’ choices. Participants chose self-sacrificial cooperation (A; Choice 1 above) 
establish a track record of cooperation with his or her partner at the
g hey also chose self-interested defection (B; Choice 2 above) to establish a t
record of competitiveness. Sometimes, participants chose (C) self-sacrificial cooperation 
after their partner had chosen self-interested defection to try to communicate to their 
partner that cooperation was the goal and that defection was not be necessary to earn a lo
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of nickels. Conversely, participants chose self-sacrificial cooperation after having earlier
chosen self-interested defection (D), possibly signaling regret and a renewed interest in 
working towards the game’s objective. They also chose self-interested defection in 
response to their partner’s choice of self-interested defection (E) to let the partner know 
that anything less than cooperation would not be tolerated. And finally, on occasion, 
young and older adults both chose self-interested defection after having first re-
established mutual cooperation with a once-selfish partner, possibly as a way to help the 
partner experience what it felt like to be taken advantage of (F). All of these behavio
were demonstrated by young and older adults in similar frequencies in each experiment.
 For example, when interacting with friends, young and older adults were more 
hospitable to TFT than Selfish partners, so more participants engaged in sustained s
sacrificial cooperation. When the Selfish Friend defected, young and older adults wer
equally likely to respond with self-sacrificial cooperation. Moreover, when interacting 
with strangers, more sustained patterns of self-interested defection were found for both 
young and older adults. However, young adults consistently defected on more turns than
did older adults after the Selfish Stranger defected (E above). This means that older 
adults were more conciliatory than young adults, as they were more likely to respond to 
the transgressions of the Selfish Stranger with self-sacrificial cooperation (C above). 








nly emerged when interacting with the Selfish Stranger. It is not clear why older adults 
were not more coo t the outset of the 
o
perative overall than young adults, as was predicted a
experiments. One possibility is that participants did not have adequate time to use 
multiple strategies or to determine how best to sequence the strategies that they had 
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chosen to be effective. Future examinations of young and older adults’ reactions to 
gaming partners might allow for more turns in each round or for multiple rounds wit
same partners so that micro-genetic changes in strategy implementation can be 
investigated (Luwel, Siegler, & Verschaffel, 2008; Siegler, 2007; Siegler & Chen, 20
One might expect that, although young and older adults display similar behavior in the 
first interaction with a partner, perhaps older adults would be more likely than young 
adults to begin to implement more cooperative sequences of strategies (i.e., more 
of choosing Doors A and C) in repeated exposures to the same partner. Given the limit
length of the rounds, the data do not speak to subtle changes in variability that may sign
emergent cooperative tendencies. Nevertheless, this would be a promising direction in 
which to take this interactive paradigm. From a more macro-behavioral level, partic
did react differently to the four partner types. Theoretical accounts for why young and 
older adults both were differentially cooperative with friends and strangers are discussed 
below, separately for the TFT and Selfish partner types. 
 











 Despite learning in the Alone Round that the optimal strategy for the game 
involved opening yellow doors, about half of the participants chose to defect on their f
turn when interacting with the TFT Stranger (similar to Biel & Thøgersen, 2007). You
and older adults were equally likely to do this. Also, it was not uncommon for this first 
self-interested choice to lead participants down a steady path of defection during the 
entire round with the TFT Stranger. What is striking about this finding is that particip
spontaneously chose to be competitive even though it did not help them to achieve the 
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game’s objective. One reason why this could have happened is that the individuals who 
engaged in consistent defection might have valued competition and winning (i.e., earnin
more nickels than their partner) over promoting mutual success. Given that young ad
are generally more achievement-oriented (Erikson, 1966; Hoppmann et al., in press), they
may prefer to compete rather than cooperate because success in competition illustrate
their competencies (Houston, Kinnie, Lupo, Terry, & Ho, 2000). On the other ha
adults are expected to hold more affiliative goals, so they generally value shared positive 
social experiences over individual achievement (Diehl et al., 2004; Fung & Carstensen,














a ve goals tend to operate in the context of close interpersonal relationships (e.g., 
friends and family members), it is possible that older adults displayed competitive or 
confrontational behaviors when interacting with the TFT Stranger because these goals 
were not active. Another possibility is that the game situation used in these two 
experiments naturally evoked the competitiveness that is engrained in the individualistic
psyche of our culture. As a result, age differences that are normally observed in affiliative
goals do not play out in interactions with strangers. Previous research demonstrates t
older adults are not immune to holding a competency-oriented focus when forming blam
attributions in instrumental/achievement oriented situations (Blanchard-Fields, Baldi, 
Stein, 1999; Blanchard-Fields, Chen, Schocke, & Hertzog, 1998). The results from 
Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with this finding. 
 The goals that young and older adults reported having in their minds during the 
Interactive Rounds with strangers provide some support for the interpretation that 
participants brought a competitive focus to the game even though optimal performan
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demanded cooperation. First, young adults offered proportionally more competitive 
than cooperative or ambivalent goals when interacting with the TFT Stranger. Second, 
despite the fact that older adults were more likely to report ambivalent goals tha
cooperative or competitive goals, they too reported more competitive than cooperative 
goals when interacting with the TFT Stranger. Besides reporting a competitive focus, 
both young and older adults tended not to strictly favor consistent (100% of the time) 
cooperation. Presumably, because more communal and affiliative goals are active when 
individuals are engaged in a task with friends, cooperation was higher in Experiment 2. 
Consistent with this finding, young and older adults both proportionally had more of a 
cooperative focus than a competitive one when interacting with friends and thus 
cooperated more with the TFT Friend than with the TFT Stranger. This replicates 
previous research in which young adults made more cooperative choices when interacti





5.3 Cooperation Declines over Time in Interactions with  
nger 
 
Selfish Strangers and Friends 
 Participants were no less competitive on their first turn with the Selfish Stra
than on their first turn with the TFT Stranger. Again, some participants chose to defect 
immediately and then to continue to defect throughout the round. Others shifted between 
defection and cooperation based on the behavior of the Selfish Stranger. When 
interacting with a Selfish partner, defection served as a means to block that partner from
obtaining larger amounts of nickels on every turn. However, defection also prevented the 
participant from being able to maximize the amount of nickels that they themselves 
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earned. As a result, participants would benefit from defecting only sparingly in response 
to a defection by the Selfish Stranger. Excessive retaliation during the round with the 
Selfish Stranger would further exacerbate the conflict as neither individual would be able 
to pursue the game’s objective. Previous research suggests that young adults are more 
confrontational than older adults in interpersonal problems (Birditt & Fingerman, 2005;
Blanchard-Fields, 2007), and that older adults tend to suppress anger rather than express 
it openly in a conflict (Blanchard-Fields, 1998; Blanchard-Fields et al., 2004; Gross, 
Carstensen, Pasupathi, Tsai, Skorpen, & Hsu, 1997). Consistent with these predictions, 
older adults retaliated less frequently after the Selfish Stranger’s first defection. 
Additionally, when the Selfish Stranger was the first partner that participants played in 
the Interactive Rounds, older adults were more cooperative than young adults. In othe
words, older adults were more likely to passively choose to cooperate with the Selfish 
Stranger after a defection in hopes that the stranger would break this pattern and 
reciprocate. In the future, a follow-up experiment is needed to replicate this finding for 
two reasons. First, although the difference in overall cooperation for the Selfish Stranger 
was significant between Player Order and Age Group, the Age Group x Player Order x 
Partner Type interaction reported in Experiment 1 was marginal. Second, this single 
condition was the only one in which young adults were outperformed by older adults and
thus can appear to be an aberration (however, see endnote 4). 




n the participants interacted with the 
istent 
 
TFT Stranger, it can be argued that affiliative goals should not strongly influence the 
choices of young and older adults when interacting with the Selfish Stranger. Cons
with this assertion, young adults were proportionally more likely to describe competitive
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goals than cooperative or ambivalent goals when interacting with the Selfish Stranger. 
Again, although older adults were more likely to report ambivalent goals than 
cooperative or competitive goals, they too reported more competitive than coopera
goals when interacting with the Selfish Stranger. Given the similarity between young an
older adults competitive approach to the round with the Selfish Stranger, what accounts 
for older adults’ increased willingness to choose self-sacrificial cooperation in the face
conflict with this partner? Two possible explanations emerged from the data.  
 First, older adults who cooperated more with the Selfish Stranger held marginally
more communal values than those who cooperated less. Although this finding is 
inconsistent with the substantial difference in older adults’ self-reported competit
cooperative goals for the round, it is possible that some of those who reported amb
goals were also interested in fostering a positive interaction with the Selfish Stranger. 







xamined using a more discriminating coding scheme. Another possible explanation is 
that older adul ess their 





ts were cooperating more because they were trying not to expr
tranger. The literature on emotion
d trates that older adults will suppress their negative emotions or avoid expressing 
anger in order to prevent an interpersonal conflict from growing larger (Birditt & 
Fingerman, 2005; Blanchard-Fields, 1988; Coats & Blanchard-Fields, 2008). Although 
the participants’ emotional reactions to the Selfish Stranger were not directly as
the data do indirectly speak to the affective tone created by the simulated interaction. 
First, in response to being taken advantage of by the Selfish Stranger, older adults used 
retaliatory defection less frequently than did young adults. By minimizing retaliation
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immediately after a defection, older adults might have been attempting to dampen their 
frustration with the Selfish Stranger. In so doing, they would have been more likely th
young adults to have noticed that the Selfish Stranger reciprocated 75% of the time (i.e., 
defected less than expected). By retaliating less and cooperating more, older adults mig
have had a subjectively more positive experience than young adults. Additional evidence
for possible age differences in the affective tone that developed during the interaction 
with the Selfish Stranger can be found in the participants’ trait impressions. Although
a direct measure of the participants’ emotional reactions to each round, trait impression 
judgments provide a window into the experience that participants had while inter
with their partners during the game. More favorable impressions should emerge from 
those interactions where participants felt like they were able to make progress towards 
achieving the game’s objective. Consistent with the interpretation that older adults 
experienced a more positive interaction with the Selfish Stranger, older adults’ 
impressions of the Selfish Stranger were more favorable than were those of young adult
 Finally, it is worth noting that participants also had more favorable impressions of
the Selfish Friend than of the Selfish Stranger. Although their interactions with the 
Selfish Friend were competitive, participants presumably held more affiliative goals 
when interacting with friends than with strangers. Young and older adults were both more 








 a limit to their willingness 
to be taken advantage of by their friends in the game. Interestingly, this reluctance to 
remain their friend’s patsy carried over to their attributions, as both young and older 
adults formed less favorable impressions of their friends when in the Selfish condition 
than in the TFT condition. Although older adults did hold more favorable impressions of 
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their friends than did young adults, no age differences emerged in level of cooperation 
toward the Selfish Friend, suggesting that young and older adults managed con
their friends in exactly the same manner.  
 Overall, members of both age groups displayed cooperative and confrontational 
behavior during the course of the game. Consistent with the literature, older adults used 
confrontational retaliation more sparingly than young adults when interacting with 












older adults were just as antagonistic as young adults when interacting with partners who 
did not themselves instigate conflict. Of course, young and older adults were both
likely to create an obstacle to their partner’s goal when they interacted with friends than 
with strangers. The everyday problem solving literature is replete with experiments that 
examine how young and older adults react to problems that develop in their lives (e.g.,
Thornton & Dumke, 2005). These two experiments examined this as well. Howev
addition, these two experiments also examined how likely young and older adults were t
create an obstacle for their interaction partner. More research is needed to characterize
the underlying motivation of those individuals who create conflicts in close relations
or in interactions with strangers. The participants had nothing to gain from the 
experiment by competing with their partner other than bragging rights for winning
game. Certainly, some degree of competition is inherent to (or a demand characteristic 
of) all games, and this is definitely a limitation of the two current experiments. However
problems do arise in social interactions when one party deviates from expectations and
second party has to cope with this deviation. Future research should determine the 
conditions under which creating obstacles in a relationship (e.g., competition in games) 
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elicits positive (e.g., pride/ accomplishment) and negative (e.g., guilt/shame) emotions in
an aggressor.  
 
5.4 Defining Problem Solving Effectiveness: 
Earning Nickels Versus Controlling the Interaction 
 A second goal of these two experiments was to examine how effective young a
older adults were at reaching the objective of the game given that they had to interact 
with another person. The objective of each round was to earn as many nickels as possibl
When playing on one’s own, each player was responsible for their own success. Here the
optimal strategy was simply choosing Door A and collecting 5 nickels on every turn. T
Alone Round instantiation of the game thus resembled a standard mathematical reasonin
problem, or instrumental everyday problem. Consistent with age-related differences
typically found on tests of fluid abilities and on instrumental everyday problem solving 











Round, however, young and older adults both were opening yellow doors at least two-
thirds of the time or more. Interestingly, when participants began to play the Interac
Rounds, cooperation immediately dropped to close to 50% when interacting with 
Strangers and 65% when interacting with Friends early on in the Interactive Rounds, and 
age-related differences disappeared. Of course, given their superior performance in the 
Alone Round, young adults’ performance dropped more than did that of older adults. 
What is striking about this finding is that young adults were more likely than older ad
to discover the optimal solution for the game in the Alone Round, yet they were not mo
likely than older adults to apply this strategy when interacting with others, regardless of 
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whether the partner was a Selfish partner or a TFT partner. This finding suggests that 
superior cognitive functioning does not serve as a substitute for motivated affiliative goal
pursuit in social interactions. In other word
 








but they did not use this tool for the mutual benefit of both partners in the game. 
 For both young and older adults, the shift from the Alone Round to the Interactive
Round came at a cost. On average, both age groups were less successful in the Inter
Rounds than in the Alone Rounds. However, the costs were less severe when interacting 
with friends than interacting with strangers. Unlike research on collaborative cognition, 
the participants did not benefit when the instructions of the game dictated that their 
success would be dependent upon the choices of a partner (e.g., Cheng & Strough, 2004)
This should not be surprising, however, as the participants did not actually communicate
nor work directly with (i.e., side-by-side in plain view of one another) their partners. 
Success in the iterated PD game adapted in these two experiments required that each 
player trust the intentions of the other player. Any deviation from self-sacrificial 
cooperation reduced how effective the participants were at meeting the game’s objectiv
This intriguing finding, the drastic drop in cooperation between the end of the Alone 
Round and the beginning of the Interactive Round, begs the question of what pa
were thinking when they shifted their strategy away from a tendency of delayed 
gratification when playing on their own to one of immediate reward when interacting 
with others. One possibility is that the participants were unsure of how their partner 
would behave in the game, so, rather than blindly choosing to cooperate on their first 
turn, they would wait for their partner to display cooperative intentions first. Of cou
this would never happen as the computer programs were specifically designed to 
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reciprocate cooperation but never to initiate it. This design feature of the computer 
programing is a limitation of both experiments, as it likely exaggerated the competitive 
tentions of the participants. To address this limitation, future studies should see how the 
participants react if (a e game and 





) the computer-simulated partner goes first in th
lsberger, Sasse, & McCarthy, 2003), and (b) they are pu
instructed to work with their gaming partner (Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000). In 
both cases, a more cooperative tone may emerge at the start of the game if either 
manipulation alleviates the participants’ initial skepticism towards their partner’s 
intentions. 
 In each of the two experiments, participants displayed specific reactions to the 
two different player types (i.e., TFT and Selfish partners). When interacting with TFT 
partners, the most effective strategy involved choosing Door A in the first turn and th
continuing to open Door A on every other turn. On average, young and older adults 
displayed equivalent levels of cooperation with TFT partners in each experiment. A 
substantial number of participants remained consistent throughout the round and only 
repeated their first choice (i.e., 100% cooperation or defection). Additionally, a number 
of young and older adults never fully took advantage of the TFT partner’s willingn
reciprocate, nor did they attempt to learn over time if their partner would be willing to 
cooperate for mutual gain. This finding is inconsistent with previous research 
demonstrating that young adults learn to cooperate with a TFT Stranger over time (Ba
& Rachlin, 2001; however, see Biel & Thøgersen, 2007). As alluded to above, young and 
older adults might have failed to display higher or increasing levels of cooperation 
toward the TFT Stranger because they did not trust that the stranger would choose self-
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sacrificial cooperation. Young and older adults’ tendencies toward adopting competitiv
goals when playing with the TFT Stranger were consistent with this interpretation. 
Interestingly, young and older adults held more cooperative goals when interacting with 












Before one can conclude that participants are generally less cooperative with friends than 
with strangers, an additional confound needs to be addressed. Participants in Experiment 
2 knew who their partners were and had some personal information upon which to base 
their choices early on in the Interactive Round. In Experiment 1, participants did not hav
any information about the other player. Based on the data from Experiments 1 and 2
not possible to determine if participants were less cooperative because they were 
interacting with strangers in Experiment 1 or because they were highly skeptical of the 
intentions of their partners given the complete anonymity of the interaction. Future 
research can address this concern by manipulating the character of the TFT Stranger (
volunteers at a soup kitchen / steals car emblems off of expensive cars) to determine 
which traits in a partner best predicts first-choice self-sacrificial cooperation on the part 
of young and older participants. Alternately, Experiment 1 could be repeated in such a
way that multiple strangers are recruited in a single session and made to believe that they 
are interacting with one another. It is important to keep in mind that, despite havi
information in the friend-to-friend interactions, average cooperation never approached
ceiling, suggesting that neither age group was completely effective when interacting 
the TFT partner.  
 When interacting with Selfish partners, again the most effective strategy involved
choosing Door A in the first turn and in every other turn in which one held a yello
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Because the Selfish partners would pass blue keys 25% of the time, the participant w
have to choose Door C and pass the Selfish partner a yellow key, despite the conflict, if 
they were ever to have an opportunity to raise their per-turn average over 2 nickels. As 
was the case with the TFT partners, some participants immediately chose Door B o
first turn to again avoid the risk of being taken advantage of by their partners. Althou
these individuals would earn more nickels than their partner, they were less effective t
those individuals who did cooperate with the Selfish partner. Interestingly, althou















in ing with the Selfish Stranger and thus more effective in their interactions with 
them. One side effect of this difference was that older adults allowed themselves to be 
taken advantage of more frequently by Selfish Strangers than did young adults. This is 
consistent with reports which suggest that older adults are more likely to be the victim
scams than are young adults (Mackin, 1994). However, it is important to keep in min
that the participants never verbally communicated with or interacted with the Selfish 
Stranger face-to-face, so the findings in Experiment 1, although consistent with this 
claim, should not be taken as evidence for it. 
 Rather than considering older adults as being more susceptible to scams, perhap
a stronger case can be made for the suggestion that there are some circumstanc
which older adults’ greater reliance on passive problem solving strategies help them to be 
more effective at solving interpersonal problems (Blanchard-Fields, 2007). In social 
interactions with strangers, an older adult may actually benefit from using passive o
avoidant strategies (a) if use of such strategies does not come at a substantial or 
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meaningful loss to the older adult, and (b) if use helps to minimize or eliminate any 
negative or hostile emotions being directed at or experienced by the older adult. If c
are greater (e.g., elder abuse), use of more direct instrumental (e.g., restraining order) or 
proactive emotion regulation (e.g., seek consultation or social support) strategies might 
actually be more effective. However, the obstacles that participants faced in the game 
conducted in Experiments 1 and 2 posed no serious costs. Of course, this is also a 
limitation of the two experiments. In everyday life, there are benefits gained by phasing 
out social interaction with those individuals who are recurrent sources of stress. Previous 
work suggests that older adults report lower levels of well-being and life satisfaction 
when they experience interpersonal stressors (Newsom, Nishishiba, Morgan, & Ro
2003; Rook, 2003) and when they do not prune their social networks to eliminate those 
partners that frequently create negative interactions (Fingerman & Birditt, 2003; Kra
& Rook, 2004). Given the minimal costs associated with using passive, self-sacrificing 
cooperation in the iterated PD game, it is fair to suggest that older adults were more 
effective than young adults at managing conflict with the Selfish Stranger. 
 When interacting with the Selfish Friend, young and older adults were equally 
effective at managing conflicts. Both cooperated more with the Selfish Friend than the 
Selfish Stranger, and both reduced their level of cooperation in response to self-interested 
defections by the Selfish Friend. Even though young and older adults had a track record






e after every noticeable defection. However, despite the obstacles 
created by the Selfish Friend, both young and older adults were more likely to report 
having approached this round with cooperative goals in mind rather than competitive 
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goals. This is also consistent with the notion that interactions with close others activate 
affiliative goals that motivate individuals to behave in ways to protect the already 
established social bond (Hoppmann, et al., in press; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 
1998). 
 
5.5 Final Summary 
 Overall, these two experiments originally sought to provide evidence to support 
the claim that older adults had more social expertise (i.e., were more likely to flexibly 
adapt to the demands of various social situations) than young adults. However, with one 
exception, young and older adults displayed nearly identical patterns of cooperation an
were equally effective in managing their interactions with friends and with strangers. 
Two important differences emerged between young and older adults behavior in these 
two experiments. First, older adults were more cooperative than young adults when 
interacting with the Selfish Stranger, particularly when they interacted with this partner
the first of the two Interactive Rounds (in Experiment 1). Second, older adults held mo
favorable impressions of Selfish partners than did young adults (in Experiments 1 an











im ent passive interpersonal strategies in order to lessen the negative impact that 
conflicts impose upon social interaction and to create as positive as of an experience 
possible given the behavior of the Selfish partner. This is consistent with previous 
research which suggests that older adults may use passive strategies to avoid worseni
conflict (Birditt & Fingerman, 2005) and to create an opportunity to minimize negativ
emotions (Blanchard-Fields, 2007). From an objective standpoint, young and old
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were nearly equally effective in all conditions. However, from a subjective standpoin
older adults may have experienced more positive social interactions than did young 
adults. Future experiments will need to directly test the impact that interactions such as 
those simulated in an iterated PD game have on the well-being of young and older adults
Although these two experiments were originally developed so as to provide an objectiv
measure of interpersonal problem solving success, no one clear answer emerged. Y
and older adults were equally effective at working towards the game’s instrumental goal,
and neither consistently displayed more cooperative intentions or behaviors in the game.  
 Although these two experiments attempted to use an iterated PD paradigm to 
investigate how young and older adults might react to conflict, the findings reported 
generated a number of additional questions that future research will need to address. 
First, in the current experiments, participants were not provided with any information 
about the character of the strangers with whom they were interacting. Lower levels of 
cooperation may have resulted as previous research suggests that participants may be










anonymity, is completely unpredictable (Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). Any form
of positive personal identification is likely to improve early levels of cooperation 
(Brañas-Garza, 2006; Burnham, 2003; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Postemes, Spears, 
Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001). Future research will have to examine whether cooperative 
trends improve when strangers actually meet each other prior to the start of the session
if providing positive or negative character information about fictional strangers 
influences young and older adults’ initial willingness to cooperate. Similarly, future 
research may purposefully instruct participants to work together with their gaming 
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partners to meet the game’s objective goal (Burnham et al., 2000). Doing this might help
to reduce the participants’ skepticism towards their partner’s intentions or help to d





Future research might also manipulate the social standing of the fictional stranger 
.g., interact with authority figure or arrange a cross-generational interaction) to see if 





interaction. Of course, participants in these two experiments never really interacted with
their partners during the game. Future studies should also compare the behavior of 
strangers and friends who interact with one another in separate rooms to the behavior of 
strangers and friends who actually interact with one another in the same room (e.g., Ecke
& Wilson, 2006). Previous research suggests that a group of individuals may require 
more time to effectively work together from long distances using computers because th
rate of information uptake about one’s partners is reduced through this means of 






 1 Of the 153 participants, 17 (11%) were excluded from data analysis. Six 
people in the Interactive Rounds (5 young adults and 1 older adult). Ten participants (5 
participants to calibrate the timing of the decisions made by the computer partners. 
these exclusions, the total sample size for Experiment 1 was n = 136. Participant 
stranger programs. Participants played the Tit-for-Tat player first in the first 
participants were excluded being they did not believe that they were playing with real 
young and 5 older adults) were excluded because they served as pilot experiment 
Finally, one older adult was excluded because E-prime failed to record a data file. After 
assignment was counterbalanced across the order with which individuals played the two 
counterbalance, but played the Selfish player first in the second counterbalance. Overall, 
women, and 1 unspecified) assigned to the first counterbalance and 38 young adults (23 
nd 
counterbalance.  
 Although the optimal strategy involved choosing Door A on every turn, it was 
r 
of nickels earned per turn below the optimal average of 5 and more toward 4 nickels per 
5 
nickels per turn. If a participant chose the combination A-B-C-A-B-C… then the Selfish 
o 
use the strategy B-C-B-C-B-C… then they would have averaged 3.5 nickels per turn. 
of the 8 possible defections. At the end of the Alone Round, consistent use of the ideal 
acceptable and did not hinder the participant from noticing the Selfish Stranger’s self-
 
vel 
of cooperation (i.e., choosing Doors A or C) between the last four turns of the Alone 
reported above, young adults (M = 0.42, SE = 0.06) displayed a larger average decrease 
= 3.13. For young adults, the size of this drop was marginally related to a number of 
ung 
adults were associated (a) with being less capable of talking to a third party about a 
ith 
whom a conflict has developed (r = -.20, n = 70, p < .10), (c) with having more difficulty 
 = 
69, p < .10), and (d) with having a less expansive view of one’s future time (r = -.20, n = 
there were 33 young adults (18 men and 15 women) and 33 older adults (14 men, 18 
men and 15 women) and 32 older adults (15 men and 17 women) assigned to the seco
 
2 
not uncommon to deviate from this pattern. Each deviation reduced the average numbe
turn (e.g., Doors A-B-C). The example mentioned, A-A-B-C, yielded an average of 4.2
Stranger would have still been able to instigate conflict. If the participant had chosen t
More importantly, it would have only been possible for such a participant to experience 4 
strategy was preferred, but consistent use of a slightly less ideal strategy was still 
interested behavior.  
 3 A difference score was calculated for each participant’s change in average le
Round and the first four turns of the Interactive Rounds. Consistent with the findings 
in cooperation between the two rounds than did older adults (M = 0.18, SE = 0.05), t(134) 
individual difference variables. Specifically, larger declines in cooperation for yo
conflict (r = -.21, n = 70, p < .09), (b) with being less capable of avoiding a person w
working with someone to find a mutually satisfying solution to a conflict (r = -.20, n
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70, p < .10). For older adults, larger declines in cooperation between the Alone and 
inductive reasoning ability (r = .28, n = 64), (b) with being less capable of putting an 
communal values (r = -.27, n = 62), and (d) with being less conscientious (r = -.36, n =
marginally associated with having higher verbal ability (r = .22, n = 64, p < .09) and 
 
4
Player Order x Age Group interaction using G*Power 3 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lan
is considered to be a medium effect size using Cohen’s standards for multivariate 
be 0.84 at α = .05 (or 0.64 at α = .01). This suggests that there is a 16% chance of fa
those individuals who chose Doors A or C on two out of every three turns in the last 
Once again, the Stranger Type x Player Order x Age Group interaction was marginal, 
Selfish Stranger when they interacted with the Selfish Stranger first (M = 0.44, SE = 
Additionally, older adults (M = 0.44, SE = 0.06) in this counterbalance (i.e., Selfish 
0.23, SE = 0.05), t(52) = 2.65. A power analysis conducted on the three-way inter
resulting from this additional analysis estimated power to be 0.91 at 
= .01). This means that there is a 9% chance of f
Interactive Rounds were significantly (p < .05) associated (a) with having greater 
interpersonal disagreement out of one’s mind (r = -.25, n = 64), (c) with holding fewer 
 
64). Also, larger declines in cooperation between the Alone and Interactive Rounds were 
holding fewer agentic values (r = -.23, n = 62, p < .07) for older adults. 
  A post-hoc power analysis was conducted on the marginal Stranger Type x 
g, 
& Buchner, 2007). This software estimated the effect size for the analysis at 0.15, which 
analysis of variance (at 0.80 level of power; Cohen, 1992). Power (1-β) was estimated to 
lsely 
rejecting the null hypothesis for this interaction.  The data were re-analyzed using only 
quarter (i.e., last eight turns) of the Alone Round (66.7%; Young n = 54, Old n = 41). 
F(1,91) = 3.88, p < .06, η2 = .041. Once again, older adults cooperated more with the 
0.06) as opposed to after the TFT Stranger (M = 0.24, SE = 0.06), t(39) = 2.32. 
Stranger first) cooperated more with the Selfish Stranger than did young adults (M = 
action 
α = .05 (or 0.76 at α 
alsely rejecting the null hypothesis for 
this interaction. Overall, these additional analyses suggest that there is sufficient power to 
detect the reported marginal three-way interaction (at power level = 0.80), and that the 
power for detecting this interaction is improved by only focusing on those participants 
who were consistently cooperating at the end of the Alone Round.  
 
 5 It is worth nothing that the above findings fail to support two additional a priori 
predictions. First, contrary to expectations, young and older adults displayed equivalent 
levels of cooperation with the TFT Stranger, t(134) = .86, ns. In fact, in looking at turn-
by-turn behavior, the proportions of young and older adults who created conflict with the 
intention of getting ahead (i.e., did not later choose C to balance scores) when interacting 
with the TFT Stranger did not differ (Hypothesis 5), χ2(1)= .001 (n = 97, p = .97). 
Second, although Player Order did interact Stranger Type and Age Group in the ANOVA 
examining overall cooperation in the Interactive Rounds, there was no evidence that 
young adults would cooperate less with the TFT Stranger if they interacted with this 
stranger after interacting with the Selfish Stranger rather than interacting with the TFT 
Stranger first (Hypothesis 8), t(69) = .20, ns. Contrary to expectations, young adults did 




 6 The three categories were co egree of cooperation, with 100% 
Defection = 0, “Somewhere in between” = 0.5, and 100% Defection = 1. The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test compares repeated m o determine which of a pair is 
larger. Equivalent scores are called ties. The resulting statistic indicates which variable 
had a higher average rank across all member of a sample. For more information about 





2 = .14. Older adults held more favorable impressions of the Selfish 






 alert to pick the right key from the right door”. It is important to 










 7 Contrary to predictions (Hypothesis 9), Player Order did not impact the 
aggregate positive trait attributions of young adults. Young adults did not rate the TFT 
Stranger less favorably if they played this stranger after the Selfish Stranger rather
before, t(69) = 0.03, ns. Also, it is possible that those individuals who had more diff
with the game (i.e., older adults more so than young adults) might rate the Selfish 
Stranger more favorably than those who did well in the Alone Round and were 
subsequently taken advantage of in the Selfish Round. To examine this possibility, a 2 
(Age Group) x 2 (Stranger Type) x 2 (Player Order) mixed model ANOVA w
conducted on the aggregate positive attribution scores of those individuals who chose 
Doors A or C at least two-thirds of the time during the last quarter of the Alone Round
Once again, main effects of Age Group, F(1,88) = 18.75, η2 = .18, and Stranger Type, 
F(1,88) = 31.55, η2 = .26, were qualified by a Stranger Type x Age Group interaction, 
F(1,88) = 13.84, η
S r 
= 2.3; Young Selfish: M = 65.7, SE = 1.8; Old Selfish: M = 82.1, SE = 2.0). Overall, thes
results are identical to those reported above; older adults held more favorable impression
of strangers than did young adults, particularly the Selfish Stranger. 
 
 8 Examples of cooperative statements included: “Keep choosing Door A and hope
the other person does as well”, “Both participants would essentially have to cooperate 
and award each other yellow keys”, and “Click only on Door A”; Examples of 
competitive statements included: “Try to give the other person a blue key which is worth 
less”, “Pick a door that will give your partner a key to a door with fewer nickels”, and  
“Beat my opponent and get the most”; Examples of neither cooperative nor coope
statements included: “Try to find a repetitive sequence”, “Try to get as many nickels a
possible”, and “To be
n t
were temporally different from one another. Before the Interactive Rounds, participants 
were predicting how one should behave to maximize their nickels. After the Interactiv
Rounds, participants indicated the goal that they held in mind during the round. Given
this difference, participants would sometimes offer “wait and see” types of responses. 
These responses were coded as ambivalent. Unfortunately, all responses that included 
task irrelevant information were also coded as ambivalent. As a result, the ambivalent
category includes items that reflect partner-contingent strategies, instrumental strategie
(e.g., maximize nickels), and non-codeable responses. Future coding schemes will ha
to further tease apart the responses beyond the three categories used here (and in 
Experiment 2) in order to draw comparisons between the before and after responses. 
Within-subjects analyses reported here are limited to responses provided to the same 
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open-ended question asked of participants immediately after each of the Interactive 
Rounds. 
 
 9 Age differences in each of the social individual difference measures are 
characterized in Appendix A for each experiment. For the Alone Round, tertiles were 
calculated separately on percentage of cooperation for each age group. Although the top 
and bottom groups did not differ in cognitive performance for young adults, the two 
groups did differ for older adults. Specifically, older adults in the top tertile of the Alone 
ound had higher mean scores on inductive reasoning (Top: M = 18.8, SE = 1.1; Bottom: 










2, n = 70, p < .07). When young adults interacted with the Selfish Stranger, there was a 
significant negative relationship between average cooperation and competitiveness level 
R
M .6, SE = 1.1) and verbal ability (Top: M = 25.3, SE = 1.7; Bottom: M = 19.6, S
1.5), t(43) = 2.65 and t(43) = 2.52, respectively. The top tertile was also more educated 
(Top: M = 7.8, SE = 0.3; Bottom: M = 5.5, SE = 0.5) and reported better overall health 
(Top: M = 3.9, SE = 0.2; Bottom: M = 3.3, SE = 0.2), t(39) = 3.95 and t(41) = 2.34
respectively. The following were the demarcations for the tertiles for young and older 
adults when interacting with the TFT Stranger: Young 0.0 (n = 28), 0.0001-0.9999 (n = 
19), and 1.0 (n = 24); Old < 0.1251 (n = 22), 0.1251-0.7187 (n = 21), and > 0.7187 (n = 
22). The following were the demarcations for the tertiles for young and older adults w
interacting with the Selfish Stranger: Young < 0.0314 (n = 24), 0.0314-0.2812 (n = 17), 
and > 0.2812 (n = 30); Old < 0.1564 (n = 24), 0.1564-0.4687 (n = 18), and > 0.4687 (n
23). 
 10 The use of a median- or tertile-split to divide a sample into equally-sized gr
along a normally-distributed continuous variable can be problematic from a 
methodological stand point (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002; Owen &
Froman, 2005; Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005). Two limitations
this approach are (1) that variance found in the middle of the distribution is discarded as 
error variance, and (2) that the analyst assumes that the groups that are created accurately 
capture distinct differences between participants rather than creating an artificial 
dichotomy that does not truly reflect the response distribution. For the current 
experiment, the distributions of the average cooperation displayed in the Interactive 
Rounds were not normal (especially those for the TFT Stranger which were bipolar). 
Although some explanatory variance is lost by dividing the sample into tertiles, doing s
 justified by the distinctiveness of the groups that result. Relative to the TFT Stranger is
distributions, the tertile-split captured the tendencies for many participants to cooperate 
or to defect 100% of the time. With respect to the Selfish Stranger distributions, although
these distributions were not normal, a fair number of participants did fall in the middle 
tertile. Some response variance was ignored when this middle tertile was excluded from 
the above analyses. To address this limitation, nonparametric rank-order correlations 
(Spearman’s rho, ρ) were computed for average cooperation with each stranger typ
the individual difference measures (i.e., social values and goals and the cognitive 
measures). When young adults interacted with the TFT Stranger, there was a significant 
positive relationship between average cooperation and how difficult it was for the 
participant to put disagreements out of their mind (ρ = .26, n = 69) and a marginal 
negative relationship between cooperation and how much difficulty the participants felt 




(ρ 5, n = 70) and a marginal negative relationship between cooperation and 
extraversion level (ρ = -.22, n = 70, p < .07). When older adults interacted with the TFT 
Stranger, there was a significant positive relationship between average cooperation a
one’s tendency to suppress one’s emotions (ρ = .29, n = 64), a marginal positive 
relationship between cooperation and one’s conscientiousness level (ρ = .21, n = 64, p <
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th icipants felt they would have in finding a mutually satisfying solution to a conf
with someone else (ρ = -.21, n = 64, p < .10). Finally, when older adults interacted with
the Selfish Stranger, there was a significant positive relationship between average 
cooperation and how difficult participants found it would be to blame themselves for a 
disagreement (ρ = .26, n = 64), a marginal positive relationship between cooperation and 
the number of communal values endorsed by participants (ρ = .22, n = 62, p < .09)
marginal negative relationship between cooperation and how likely participants were to
try to regulate or change their partners in a conflict (ρ = -.22, n = 63, p < .09). 
 
 11 Of the 147 participants, data for the Interactive Round were not saved by E-
prime for three young adults, all of which were assigned to the Selfish Friend condition. 
The Alone Round data for these participants were included in analyses. Overall, there 
were 38 young adults (21 men and 17 women) and 36 older adults (15 men and 21 
women) assigned to the TFT Friend condition. There were 35 young adults (20 men and 
15 women) and 35 older adults (14 men and 21 women) assigned to the Selfish Friend 
condition. 
 
 12 When comparing Experiment 1 with Experiment 2, only th
in ion from the two Interactive Rounds were used from Experiment 1. 
 
 13 A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Experiment: Strangers versus Friends) x 2 (Partner Typ
x 8 (Time) mixed model ANOVA conducted on the participants’ Alone Round 
cooperation proportions revealed that main effects of Age Group, F(1,275) = 56.88, η2 = 
.17, and Partner Type, F(1,275) = 4.26, η2 = .02, and Time, F(7,1925) = 11.77, η2 = .04, 
were qualified by a Time x Age Group interaction, F(7,1925) = 8.75, η2 = .03. This 
interaction was driven by older adults’ significant improvement in the game over time. 
For example, the contrast between older adults’ first and last 4-turn blocks revealed a 
significant difference in performance, t(135) = 4.21 (Mdiff = 0.12, SE = 0.03) . As 
mentioned previously mentioned for both experiments, young adults remained stable in 
their performance and outperformed older adults at every time point during the Alone 
Round. The main effect of Partner Type occurred because, across experiments, 
participants assigned to play the TFT Player (M = 0.76, SE = 0.02) in the interactive 
round (first in E1) had slightly less success in the Alone Round than those assigned to 
play the Selfish Player (first in E1; M = 0.81, SE = 0.02). 
 
 14 E-prime failed to save data in the Interactive Rounds for three of the young 
adults. All three of these players were assigned to the Selfish Friend condition. Althou




 15 A difference score was calculated for each participant’s change in average 
of cooper
level 
ation (i.e., choosing Doors A or C) between the last four turns of the Alone 


















reported above, young adults (M = 0.26, SE = 0.05) displayed a larger average dec
in cooperation between the two rounds than did older adults (M = 0.09, SE = 0.04), t(1
= 2.48. For young adults, large declines in cooperation were significantly (p < .05) 
associated (a) with reduced verbal ability (r = -.26, n = 73), (b) with increased self-
reported difficulty in flexibly implementing coping strategies (r = .24, n = 69), (c) with a 
reduced capacity for (r = -.33, n = 69) and increased difficulty in (r = .24, n = 69) giving 
into the demands of others, (d) with a reduced tendency to hold generative motives (r = -
.32, n = 69), and (e) with being less open to new experiences (r = -.24, n = 69). For olde
adults, larger declines in cooperation between the Alone and Interactive Rounds were 
significantly (p < .05) associated (a) with having greater processing speed (r = .28, n
71) and verbal ability (r = .24, n = 71), (b) with being more capable of expressing a ran
of emotions when interacting with others (r = .27, n = 69), (c) with being less capable of 
(r = -.32, n = 69) and having more difficulty with putting an interpersonal disagreement 
out of one’s mind (r = .24, n = 69), and (d) with being less able to disengage from a goal 
that is being blocked by a partner in a conflict (r = -.40, n = 69). 
 
 16
to how participants would behave early on in the Interactive Round, items from the 
friendship quality questionnaire were only minimally predictive. Young adul
friendship quality responses in no way predicted behavior early on in the game in eithe
the TFT Friend or Selfish Friend conditions. For older adults in the TFT Friend condition
friendship length was positively related to the average proportion of cooperation in the 
first quarter (i.e., turns 1-8) of the game, r(34) = .41, p < .05. For older adults in the 
Selfish Friend condition, “how well the participant felt that they know their friend
“how well the participant feels that their friend knows them” were both negativ
to cooperation in the first quarter of the game, r(34) = -.37 and r(34) = -.35, respectiv
(p’s < .05). 
 
 17 Age differences in each of the social individual difference measures are 
characterized in Appendix A for each experiment. For the Alone Round, tertiles were 
calculated separately on percentage of cooperation for each age group. The top and 
bottom tertile groups did not differ from one another in cognitive performance for either
the young or older adults. The following were the demarcations for the tertiles for young 
and older adults when interacting with the TFT Friend: Young < 0.5314 (n = 13), 0.53
0.9999 (n = 8), and 1.0 (n = 17); Old < 0.4687 (n = 12), 0.4687-0.9999 (n = 10), and 1.0 
(n = 14). The following were the demarcations for the tertiles for young and older 
when interacting with the Selfish Friend: Young < 0.1564 (n = 13), 0.1564-0.4687 (n = 
10), and > 0.4687 (n = 12); Old < 0.1564 (n = 12), 0.1564-0.4687 (n = 11), and > 0
(n = 12). 
 
 18 As mentioned previously for the results of Experiment 1, the use of a tertile-
split to divide a sample into equally-sized groups along a variable can be problematic 
because variance from the middle region of the distribution is discarded (MacCallum et 
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al., 2002; Preacher et al., 2005). Also, interpretations of differences that emerge f
tertile-split assume that the extreme groups that are created accurately capture distinct 
differences between participants. As with Experiment 1, the distributions of the average 
cooperation displayed in the Interactive Rounds were not normal. Once again, the
distributions of average cooperation with the TFT Friend were bipolar, whereas those for 
the Selfish Friend were positively skewed. Relative to the TFT Friend distributions, the 
tertile-split captured the tendencies for many participants to cooperate or to defect 100% 
of the time. With respect to the Selfish Friend distributions, although these distributions 
were not normal, a fair number of participants did fall in the middle tertile. Some 
response variance was ignored when this middle tertile was excluded from the above 
analyses. To address this limitation, nonparametric rank-order correlations (Spearman’s 
rho, ρ) were computed for average cooperation with each friend type and the individual 
difference measures (i.e., social values and goals and the cognitive measures). When 
young adults interacted with the TFT Friend, there was a significant positive relationship 
etween average cooperation and self-reported generative intentions (ρ = .38, n
rom a 
 




 be to blame themselves for an interpersonal conflict (ρ = -.51, n = 36). When 
teracting with the Selfish Friend, young adults’ average cooperation was significantly 
ositive  
 = 33), to the 








rate with their friends. 
 
(Gender) x 2 (Partner Relation) x 2 (Partner Type) x 8 (Time) mixed 
b
significant negative relationship between average cooperation and how capable they fe
they were at standing their ground in a disagreement (ρ = -.34, n = 36), and a significant 
negative relationship between average cooperation and the endorsement of implementing
self-protective social comparisons as a means of coping with conflict (ρ = -.39, n = 36). 
When young adults interacted with the Selfish Friend, cooperation had significantly 
negative relationships with neuroticism (ρ = -.38, n = 33) and how difficult participants
felt it would
in
p ly related to self-reported generative intentions (ρ = .43, n = 33), to a tendency to
endorse emotion regulation strategies geared towards reappraisal (ρ = .39, n
c
(ρ , n = 33), to being capable of giving into the demands of others (ρ = .49, n = 
33),and to using self-protective intra-individual comparisons when faced with co
= .42, n = 33). When older adults interacted with the TFT Friend, cooperation was 
significantly positively related to agreeableness (ρ = .38, n = 35). Cooperation was also 
positively related to how difficult older adults thought it would be to stand their grou
a disagreement (ρ = .46, n = 35) and negatively related to how capable older adults felt 
they were at standing their ground (ρ = .46, n = 35). Finally, when older adults interact
with the Selfish Friend, average cooperation was only marginally positively related
how capable older adults thought they would be at getting their partner to concede during
a disagreement (ρ = .33, n = 34, p < .06) and marginally negatively related to the older 
adults’ perceived quality of their relationship with their friend (ρ = -.33, n = 34, p < .06). 
Perhaps the most consistent finding across analyses (i.e., tertile-split and nonparametr
rank order correlations) was that those young adults who reported more generative 
intentions for their relationships were more likely to coope
 
 19 The only effects that emerge when gender is added to this mixed model 
ANOVA are a Partner Type x Gender interaction, F(1,263) = 5.34, η2 = .02, and a 
marginal Partner Type x Gender x Age Group interaction, , F(1,138) = 3.34, η2 = .01, p <
07. Separate 2 .
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model ANOVAs were conducted on young and older adults’ cooperation percentages in 
the Interactive Round. For older adults, no significant effects involving gender emerg
For young adults, a significant Gender x Partner Type interaction emerged, 





t(105) = 0.75, ns, and 
b) wer ust as likely (~33% of the time) to immediately pass a blue key to their partner 
; 
eal strategies were more cooperative when they were interacting with 
iends 
2 = .06. (TFT Female: M = 0.74, SE = 0.06; TFT Male: M = 0.48; SE =
0.06; Selfish Female: M = 0.23, SE = 0.07; Selfish Male: M = 0.32, SE = 0.05) 
    
 20 A 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Partner Relation) between-subjects ANOVA condu
on the participants average percentage of cooperation over the first four turns of the 
Interactive Round with the TFT partners displayed a significant main effect of Partner 
Relation, F(1,136) = 5.34, η2 = .04. Consistent with age non-specific predictions 
(Hypothesis 5), participants were more likely to cooperate with the TFT Friend (M = 
0.65, SE = 0.05) at this early point in the game than with the TFT Stranger (M = 0.49, S
= 0.05). Participants who interacted with Selfish Friends (M = 2.93, SE = 0.31) 
experienced the same number of noticeable defections as those interacting with Selfish 
Strangers (M = 2.37, SE = 0.28), t(138) = 1.34, ns. Also, after the first noticeable 
defection, participants (both young and old) (a) passed a blue key back to the Selfish 
partner for the same number of consecutive turns regardless of whether this partner was a 
friend (M = 6.39, SE = 1.26) or a stranger (M = 5.06, SE = 1.21), 
( e j
after having just broken the first sequence of defection started by that partner (i.e., “get 
even”) if that partner was a friend or a stranger, Young: χ2(1) = 1.09, n = 30, p > .29
Old: χ2(1) = 0.01, n = 38, p > .91. 
 
 21 It is worth noting that, for older adults, it appears that fewer ambivalent 
responses are offered before the start of the Interactive Round with friends than are 
offered with strangers. Instead, more cooperative responses are provided. As was 
mentioned earlier, it is difficult to characterize participants as being more or less 
cooperative or competitive using the ambivalent responses as a guide, as these responses 
include a wide range of content. However, here it appears that older adults’ self-
nominated id






Descriptions of Individual Difference Measures 
 Below are descriptions of the individual difference measures that were included in
the packet of questionnaires that participants completed prior to the laboratory sess
both Experiments 1 and 2 (abbreviated E1 and E2 when describing internal consistency 
below). 
  Interpersonal Flexibility. This 32-item measure was adapted from the Functional 
Flexibility Inventory (Paulhus & Martin, 1988), and it asked participants to consider 16 
positive and negative traits that are thought to be important during interpersonal 
interactions. Participants indicated the degree to which they were capable of displaying 
each trait and how difficult it would be to display each trait. (Capable: E1 α = 0.75, E2 α 
= 0.77; Difficulty: E1 α = 0.84, E2 α = 0.83) 
 Coping Flexibility. This 18-item survey asked participants to indicate the exte
which they were capable (E1 α = 0.56, E2 α = 0.49) of using 9 different coping styles 
and how difficult (E1 α = 0.64, E2 α = 0.54) it would be to use each. This measure was 
adapted from a coping style inventory developed by Sorkin and Rook (2006) to examine 
global reactivity to problems. Given the low internal consistency of these two forms in 
both experiments, exploratory analyses included the item aggregates as well as the 
individual items. 





tendency to use antecedent-focused (i.e., reappraisal) or response-focused (i.e., 
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suppression) emotion regulation when managing emotions (Gross & John, 2003). 
(Reappraisal: E1 α = 0.79, E2 α = 0.70; Suppression: E1 α = 0.72, E2 α = 0





1 α = 
 
pensatory secondary control 
(CSC) subscale includes items that assess a person’s strategies for internally regulating 
their emotions or disengaging from unattainable goals (E1 α = 0.41, E2 α = 0.48). Given 
the low internal consistency of the CSC subscale, each of the four items (i.e., goal 
disengagement, self-protective attribution, self-protective social comparison, and self-
protective intraindividual comparison) were considered separately in exploratory 
analyses. Finally, two additional items were included to examine participants’ 
person is concerned with being generative (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992). (E1 α = 
0.86, E2 α = 0.85)  
 Future Time Perspective. This 10-item scale assesses a participant’s view of how 
much time they have left in life (Lang & Carstensen, 2002). (E1 α = 0.91, E2 α = 0.90) 
Interpersonal Trust Scale. This 15-item scale measures the degree to which a person c
rely on others to act based on their word (Rotter, 1967). (E1 α = 0.76, E2 α = 0.72) 
 Interpersonal Control Strivings. This 14-item scale assesses the global use of 
selective and compensatory control to maintain harmony in relationships (Sorkin & 
Rook, 2004). The selective control (SC) subscale includes items that assess how a 
decides to invest personal time and energy into maintaining relationship harmony (E
0.77, E2 α = 0.74). The compensatory primary control (CPC) subscale includes items that
examine the extent to which a person asks others to be involved in helping resolve 
lational problems (E1 α = 0.72, E2 α = 0.71). The comre
119 
  
endorsement of strategies that try to regulate (e.g., train or direct) the behavior of the 
dividual with whom they are directly in conflict (E1 α = 0.78, E2 α = 0.72). 
 This 29-item scale assesses the extent 
naire (Ward, Thorn, Clements, Dixon, & Sanford, 2006) was used to assess the 
α = 
0.65, E2 α = 0.67). 
 Competitiveness Index. This 20-item scale assesses interpersonal competitiveness 
ing in
 
Age-Related Differences in Social Individual Difference Measures 
in
 Internal-External Locus of Control Scale.
to which outcomes are attributed to internal and external forces (Rotter, 1966). (E1 α = 
0.71, E2 α = 0.76) 
 Measures of Agentic and Communal Values. The 24-item Personal Attributes 
Question
extent to which a person holds agentic (E1 α = 0.73, E2 α = 0.76) and communal values 
(E1 α = 0.78, E2 α = 0.83). The questionnaire also includes an Emotional Vulnerability 
subscale that taps emotional expressivity and a need for social encouragement (E1 
(Smither & Houston, 1992), and it has previously been used in conjunction with 
assess dividual differences in competitiveness in a PD game (Houston, Kinnie, 
Lupo, Terry, & Ho, 2000). (E1 α = 0.86, E2 α = 0.86) 
  Big Five Inventory. This 10-item scale is the short version of the BFI-44 (John, 
Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) and it includes 2 items for each of the big five dimensions 
(i.e., neuroticism, extroversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and 
agreeableness). The internal consistency for each dimension was quite low (E1 α’s 0.29 
to 0.57, E2 α’s 0.18 to 0.63). 
120 
  
 Experiment 1. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare youn





 t(130) = 2.47 and t(131) = 3.28, respectively. Differences also 
merge
4.2, 
 = 0.2), and (c) how difficult it is f
SE 
M SE M SE
having a more expansive future time perspective than did older adults, t(132) = 8.96 
(Young: M = 57, SE = 0.9; Old: M = 41, SE = 1.6). Relative to young adults, older adults 
endorsed using more self-protective intraindividual comparisons (Interpersonal Control 
Strivings - Compensatory Secondary Control), t(131) = 2.79 (Young: M = 2.4, SE = 0.1; 
Old: M = 2.9, SE = 0.1). Relative to young adults, older adults had a more internal locus 
of control, t(131) = 3.03 (Young: M = 10.3, SE = 0.4; Old: M = 8.5, SE = 0.4). Older 
adults also reported having more agentic values, t(130) = 2.55 (Young: M = 3.8, SE = 0.1; 
Old: M = 4.0, SE = 0.1), and more communal values, t(130) = 2.25 (Young: M = 4.0, SE 
= 0.1; Old: M = 4.2, SE = 0.1), than young adults. In terms of personality dimensions, 
older adults were more agreeable (Young: M = 7.1, SE = 0.2; Old: M = 8.1, SE = 0.2) and 
differences emerged on the Functional Flexibility Index for both the Capable (Young
= 83, SE = 1.0; Old: M = 79, SE =1.4) and Difficulty (Young: M = 49, SE = 1.4; Old: M
57, SE = 2.0) forms,
e d on the items of the Index of Coping assessing (a) how capable individuals are of 
putting a disagreement out of their mind, t(132) = 2.06 (Young: M = 3.5, SE = 0.2; Old: 
M = 4.0, SE = 0.2), (b) how capable one is to make someone else concede when a 
problem arises in a relationship, t(132) = 2.00 (Young: M = 4.6, SE = 0.1; Old: M = 
SE or one to keep their distance from or avoid the other 
person involved in a problem, t(131) = 2.20 (Young: M = 3.3, SE = 0.1; Old: M = 2.7, 
= 0.2). Older adults reported more generative intentions than did young adults, t(132) = 
2.45 (Young:  = 57,  = 1.0; Old:  = 62,  = 1.3), whereas young adults reported 
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more conscientious (Young: M = 7.3, SE = 0.2; Old: M = 8.7, SE = 0.2) than young 
adults, t(132) = 3.75 and t(132) = 4.94, respectively, and young adults were more 
argin  
2. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare young and 
 
functions, t(139) = 1.96, p < .06 (Young: M = 43, SE = 0.6; Old: M = 41, SE = 0.7). 
Relative to older adults, young adults reported higher emotional suppression scores, 
t(139) = 2.43 (Young: M = 3.7, SE = 0.1; Old: M = 3.2, SE = 0.1), a more expansive 
future time perspective, t(139) = 8.32 (Young: M = 56, SE = 1.0; Old: M = 42, SE = 1.5), 
less interpersonal trust, t(139) = 2.04 (Young: M = 3.2, SE = 0.1; Old: M = 3.4, SE = 0.1), 
and marginally fewer generative intentions, t(139) = 1.79, p < .08 (Young: M = 58, SE = 
1.1; Old: M = 61, SE = 1.0). When faced with interpersonal problems, young adults were 
more marginally likely than older adults to endorse strategies geared at attempting to 
regulate a partner’s behavior, t(139) = 1.69, p < .10 (Young: M = 2.3, SE = 0.1; Old: M = 
2.1, SE = 0.1), or at formulating self-protective attributions, t(139) = 1.69, p < .10 
M = 2.2, SE = 0.1). Older adults were more likely than 
tive intraindividual comparisons when faced 
M = 3.0, SE = 
m ally more neurotic than older adults, t(132) = 1.82, p < .09 (Young: M = 5.3, SE =
0.2; Old: M = 4.7, SE = 0.3). 
 Experiment 
older adults on each of the above social individual difference measures. Significant 
differences emerged on the Functional Flexibility Index for both the Capable (Young: M 
= 85, SE = 1.2; Old: M = 79, SE =1.2) and Difficulty (Young: M = 49, SE = 1.4; Old: M =
56, SE = 1.8) forms, t(139) = 3.90 and t(138) = 3.32, respectively. Young adults also 
reported being marginally more capable than older adults at using a variety of coping 
(Young: M = 2.4, SE = 0.1; Old: 
young adults to endorse the use of self-protec
with a relationship conflict, t(139) = 3.75 (Young: M = 2.5, SE = 0.1; Old: 
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0.1), and to hold a more internal locus of control, t(138) = 2.02 (Young: M = 10.3, SE = 
0.5; Old: M = 8.9, SE = 0.5). Older adults also held more communal values, t(139) =
(Young: M = 4.0, SE = 0.1; Old: M = 4.3, SE = 0.1), were more emotionally expressive, 
t(139) = 2.58 (Young: M = 3.0, SE = 0.1; Old: M = 3.3, SE = 0.1), were less competitive, 
t(139) = 2.92 (Young: M = 13.7, SE = 0.5; Old: M = 11.4, SE = 0.7), were more 
agreeable, t(139) = 2.01 (Young: M = 7.0, SE = 0.2; Old: M = 7.6, SE = 0.2), were more 
conscientious, t(139) = 5.27 (Young: M = 6.8, SE = 0.2; Old: M = 8.4, SE = 0.2), and 
more open to new experiences, t(139) = 2.25 (Young: M = 7.2, SE = 0.2; Old: M =








Nickels Game Instructions Read to the Participants by the Experimenter for Experiment 1
 Overview. As describe
 










two other people whom you do not know. I don’t know who they are either. Both 
individuals are students at Georgia Tech (or senior citizens from the Atlanta commun
just like you, and they were recruited separately by another lab on the second floor. Other
than that, I don’t have any additional information about them. You are being kept apart 
from the other two players so that their proximity – or physical closeness-  to you doe
not influence your responses during the game. In a separate experimental condition, al
the players will actually sit in the same room. In each experiment, anonymity will be
maintained, but how close you are to the other players will be systematically varied. A
all of the data are collected, we will compare the performance of groups who play in 
same room with those of groups who cannot see each other. In a moment I will come 
around to your computer to start one of the programs that runs the coin game called 
“Nickels”. Before playing with the two other players, you will first play a practice round 
to become oriented with the game. After the practice round, you will play one round of 
the game by yourself. In Rounds 2 and 3, you will play the game with two other playe
Overall, the purpose of each round of the game is to earn as many coins, as many nickels, 
as possible. When you play the game by yourself, the decisions that you make in th
game will only affect your own score. However, when you play the game with someone 




 Practice Round and Round 1. Today’s game is called Nickels. It is a game of 
strategy that requires you to figure out how you can earn as many nickels as possible in 
every round. To earn nickels, you will be using keys to open doors. Each round consists 
of a random number of turns. During each turn, you will use the key that you have 
available to you to open a door. Yellow keys open yellow doors and blue keys op
doors. If you look at the picture, you see that Doors A and B are yellow doors. You must 
use a yellow key to open these doors. Doors C and D are blue doors, so you will need 
blue key to open each of these doors. Behind each door that you open, you will find som




ll in advance what you will get when you open a door 
y looking into the window at the bottom of the door. This window shows you how many 
nickels you will get when you open the door. These nickels will be added to your total. 
The window also shows you that a key is behind the door. The key that you find when 
you open the door is the key that will be available on your very next turn. For example, if 
you look at the window at the bottom of Door A, you will see that if you open Door A, 
you will find 5 nickels and a yellow key. The 5 nickels will be added to your total, and 
you will have a yellow key to use on your next turn. So if you have a yellow key for your 
next turn, your choice will be limited to choosing between Door A and Door B. Suppose 
you open Door B. If you look at the window at the bottom of Door B, you will see that 
you will find 6 nickels and a blue key. The 6 nickels will be added to your total, and you 
will have a blue key to use on your next turn. Again, when you choose a door to open, 
you get nickels and a key. Be careful because the key that you get when you open a door 
will limit your choices on the very next turn. For example, if you open Door B, you 




choosing between Door C and Door D  that you find when you open the 








e key, you will give it to the other player for their turn. So you and the other player will 
. Again, the key
part of the game comes in. The decision that you make in one turn, the decision to open a 
specific door, will influence the decision that you can make in your next turn. You have 
to figure out how to get the key that you need to open the door that you want to op
Remember, the goal of the game is to get as many nickels as you can, so you have to 
figure out how you can earn as many nickels as possible in every round.  Here’s a hint to 
help you get started. If you want to maximize the number of nickels that you earn, try to
figure out the average number of nickels that you are earning during each turn. The 
higher the average number of nickels is that you earn during each turn, the more likely 
you are to meet the game’s objective. If you have any questions during the game, plea
let me know by opening your door slightly. During each round, I will not stand over your 
shoulder. At the end of each round, please open your door slightly to let me know that 
you are ready to go on. Do not go on until I come to check your computer. Because we
programmed the game in the lab, sometimes it is sensitive. I want to make sure that 
nothing is wrong with the game before you continue.   
 
 Rounds 2 and 3. In a moment we will start Round 2. During Rounds 2 and 3, you 
will play the game with two other people. For these two rounds, the rules of the game 
have changed slightly. Before, when you opened a door, you would collect the coins a
the key behind that door. In Rounds 2 and 3, you will play with another player. When you




ta ns opening doors. When you open a door, the key that you find will be given to
the other player. The key that the other player finds will be given to you. This means tha
your choices will be dependent on the other player’s choices, and that the other player’s 
choices will be dependent upon yours. While playing the game, everyone should ha
same goal of trying to earn as many nickels as possible. How you go about doing this is 
up to each of you. Let’s go over two examples. Suppose you had a yellow key and chose 
Door A, then you would collect 5 nickels and the other player would be given the yellow
key to use on their turn. Please notice that your choice will limit the choice of the other 
player to Door A or Door B. Suppose you opened Door B with a yellow key instead of 
Door A. Then you would collect 6 nickels and you would give the blue key found behind 
Door B to the other player. This means that your choice would limit the choice of the 
other player to Door C or Door D. Because you gave them a blue key, they would only 
able to open blue doors. Let’s go over two more examples. Suppose the other player had 
a yellow key and chose Door A, then they would collect 5 nickels and they would give 
the yellow key to you for your next turn. With a yellow key, you would have to choose 
between Door A or Door B. However, the other player might decide instead to use a 
yellow key to open Door B. This means that they would collect 6 nickels and that they 
would give you a blue key to use on your next turn. With a blue key, you would then 
have to choose between Door C and Door D. During the round you will be taking turns 
with the other player. You will use a key to open a door, and then they will use a key to
open a door. You can keep track of whose turn it is by keeping track of a red box that 
surrounds the tokens. When the red box surrounds your game piece, it is your turn to
make a decision. When the red box surrounds the other player’s game piece, you will 









have to wait and allow them to make a selection. Please be patient while the other person
that you are playing with thinks about their responses. But if the other players 
consistently take a really long time to choose, or if the computer seems to freeze up, 
please let me know and I will contact the other experimenter to make sure that nothing is
wrong with their equipment. Our server does a good job to keep things synchronized, b
you never know when a problem might come up. I will be keeping in touch with the o
experimenter to make sure that everything is running smoothly upstairs.  (Participants 
play first Interactive Round. Afterwards, the following was read.) In Round 3, you will 
play against the second participant upstairs. The other experimenter said that everyth
seems to be going fine, so we’ll continue. Again, if the player takes too long to make up
their mind, please let me know so that I can ask the other experimenter to check on them.
Please let me know when you get done with the round. 
 
 Pre-Debriefing Interview Questions. 1. What did you think about the study? Did
you have any thoughts or questions? 2. Before participating, had you heard anything










, did you have any specific 
rategies in mind? 4. What about the other players? Did they use any strategies? 5. Were 
to 
st
you able to get a sense for the personality of the other players? 6. Were you at all 
surprised by the choices that the other players made? 7. Some people say that it’s hard 
know if they were playing with a real person because they don’t actually see them while 







Nickels Game Instructions Read to the Participants by the Experimenter for Experiment 2
 Overview. As described in the consent form, you will be playing a coin game with 
one another. For this experiment, we are interested in how participants communicate with
one another. Here communication is limited to the decisions that we make in the context 
of a game. There is no direct verbal communication between players. In a previous 
experiment, participants played the game with two strangers who were situated in anothe
lab. Today, you will each play one full round of the game by yourself. Afterwards, you 
will play the game with one another. Overall, the purpose of each round of the game is to 
earn as many nickels as possible. When you play the game by yourself, the decisions t
you make in the game will only affect your own score. However, when you play the 
game with each other, your decisions will affect one another’s scores. To keep the 
procedure standard for all participants, please do not ask any questions while I read 
through the instructions for the game. After I go through the instructions, each of you wi
go in separate rooms and begin the first round. At this point, when you are each in 
separate rooms, you may individually ask any questions that you might have.  
 
 Instructions for Practice Round and Round 1. Today’s game is called Nickels. It 
is a game of strategy that requires you to figure out how you can earn as many nickels as
possible in every round. Each round consists of a random number of turns. During each
turn, you will be using keys to open a door. Yellow keys open yellow doors and blue 











doors. You must use a yellow key to open these doors. Doors C and D are blue doors, so 
you will need a blue key to open each of these doors. Behind each door that yo
you will find some nickels and another key. You can tell in advance what you will ge
when you open a door by looking into the window at the bottom of the door. This 
window shows you how many nickels you will get when you open the door. These 
nickels will be added to your total. The window also shows you that a key is behind the 
door. The key that you find when you open the door is the key that will be available on
your very next turn. For example, if you look at the window at the bottom of Door A, yo
will see that if you open Door A, you will find 5 nickels and a yellow key. The 5 nickels 
will be added to your total, and you will have a yellow key to use on your next turn. So if
you have a yellow key for your next turn, your choice will be limited to choosing 






. If you look at the window at the 





ake in your next turn. There are two questions that I am commonly asked. First, “Door 
 is a yellow door, but the key in the window is blue. Does this mean that I need to have 
b
will be added to your total, and you will have a blue key to use on your next turn. Again, 
when you choose a door to open, you get nickels and a key. Be careful because the ke
that you get when you open a door will limit your choices on the very next turn. Fo
example, if you open Door B, you receive a blue key. This means that during your next 
turn your choice will be limited to choosing between Door C and Door D. Again, t
that you find when you open the door is the key that will be available on your very next 
turn. This is where the strategy part of the game comes in. The decision that you make in 





a blue key to open Door B?” The ans on is “No.” To open Door B, you 








bjective. If you have any questions during the game, please let me know by opening 
wer to this questi
yellow key to get 6 nickels and a blue key to use on your next turn. Likewise, Door C is a 
blue door that has a yellow key in the window. When you open Door C with a blue key, 
you give up that blue key to get 1 nickel and a yellow key to use on your next turn. So to 
open Door B, you need a yellow key. To open Door C, you need a blue key. When you 
open either of these two doors, the key that you get is opposite in color to the key th
you used to open the door. The second question that is commonly asked is: “Once I open 
a door, is it off-limits in the future?” The answer to this question is “No.” A door is neve
off-limits. You can open up every door as many times as you want to. To open a door, 
you have to have the key that matches that door’s color. Overall, you have to figure out 
how to get the key that you need to open the door that you want to open. Remember, 
goal of the game is to get as many nickels as you can, so you have to figure out how
can earn as many nickels as possible in every round.  Here’s a hint to help you get st
If you want to maximize the number of nickels that you earn, try to figure out the average 
number of nickels that you are earning during each turn. The higher the average num
of nickels is that you earn during each turn, the more likely you are to meet the
o
your door slightly. During each round, I will not stand over your shoulder. At the end of 
this round, please open your door slightly to let me know that you are ready to go on. Do 
not go on until I come to check your computer. Sometimes the program is sensitive, so I 




 Round 2. In a moment we will start Round 2. During this round, you will play the 
game with one another. To keep the method of the experiment the same for all 
participants, please do not ask any questions or say anything from this point forward. F
Round 2, the rules of the game have changed slightly. Before, when you opened a d
you would collect the coins and the key behind that door. When you open a door, yo
will still keep the nickels behind that door. However, rather than keep the key, you will 
give it to the other player for their turn. So you and the other player will take turns 
opening doors. When you open a door, the key that you find will be given to the other 
player. The key that the other player finds will be given to you. This means that your 
choices will be dependent on the other player’s choices, and that the other player’s 
choices will be dependent upon yours. While playing the game, everyone should h
same goal of trying to earn as many nickels as possible. How you go about doing this is 
up to each of you. Let’s go over two examples. Suppose at the start of the game, one of 
you begins with a yellow key. This person would have to choose between Door A and 
Door B. If you open Door B, you would collect 6 nickels and pass a blue key to the othe
player to use on their turn. If you open Door A, you would collect 5 nickels and pass 
yellow key to the other player to use on their turn. Suppose at the start of the game, 
someone starts the game with a blue key. This person would have to choose between 
Door C and Door D. If you open Door C, then you would collect 1 nickel and give the 
yellow key to the other player. If you open Door D, then you would collect 2 nickels and 
give the blue key to the other person. During the round you will be taking turns with on
another to open doors. You will use a key to open a door, and then they will use a key to 










surrounds the tokens. When the red box surrounds your game piece, it is your turn to 
make a decision. When the red box surrounds the other player’s game piece, you will 
have to wait and allow them to make a selection. There will be text in the top right hand 
corner of the screen which also tells you whose turn it is. When the other person is 
making their decision, please be patient. After you respond, there will be a short delay 
before the other person can see your decision. This delay is built in so that the computer
can update your scores while also passing the information to our server in the main lab
The length of the typical round varies between 8 to 12 minutes, and the computer 
determines when to end the game using some minimum number of turns and the total 
time of the round. At the end of the round, please stay seated in your testing room and 
complete the packet of questionnaires that I will give to you in a moment. I am timing th













Instructions: During the experiment in the lab, you will play an interactive game with 
relationship with the friend who will attend the lab session with you. Please keep in mi
 
1. Approximately how long have you known your friend?  ____ years ____ months 
2. During a typical month, how frequently do you visit with your friend? 
    a.  Less than once per month 
    b.  1 or 2 times per month 
 
 
    d.  6 to 10 times per month (or twice per week) 
 
    e.  11 to 15 times per month (almost every other day) 
 
    f.  Every day 
 
3. Have 
your friend. Please take a moment to answer the following questions about your 
nd 
that the answers to these questions will never be reported to your friend.  
 
 (please circle one) 
 
    c.  3 to 5 times per month (or once per week) 
 
you ever attended a major family gathering of your friend’s family?   
 (please circle one)     1.  Yes          2.  No 
 
4. Has your friend ever attended one of your family’s major family gatherings? 
 (please circle one)     1.  Yes          2.  No 
 
5. How well do you believe that you know your friend? (please circle one) 
 1. Not at all          2. Slightly          3. Moderately well          4. Very well 
 
6. How well do you believe that your friend knows you? (please circle one) 
 1. Not at all          2. Slightly          3. Moderately well          4. Very well 
 
7. How would you rate the quality of your relationship with your friend?  
(please circle one)    1. Poor     2. Fair     3. Good     4. Very Good     5. Outstanding 
 
8. How close are you with your friend? (please circle one)     
 1. Not at all close     2. Slightly close     3. Moderately close     4. Very close 
 
9. Is this friend your best or closest friend? (please circle one)     1.  Yes     2.  No 
 
10. Are you at all related to your friend by birth or by marriage? (please circle one
 
)      
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